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Abstract
Centralized power system planning covers time windows that range from ten to thirty
years. Consequently, it is the longest and most uncertain part of power system economics.
One of the challenges that power system planning faces is the inability to accurately predict
random events; these random events introduce risk in the planning process. Another
challenge stems from the fact that, despite having a centralized planning scheme, generation
plans are set first and then transmission expansion plans are carried out. This thesis
addresses these problems. A joint model for generation and transmission expansion for the
vertically integrated industry is proposed. Randomness is considered in demand, equivalent
availability factors of the generators, and transmission capacity factors of the transmission
lines. The system expansion model is formulated as a two-stage stochastic program with
fixed recourse and probabilistic constraints. The transmission network is included via a
DC approximation. The mean variance Markowitz theory is used as a risk minimization
technique in order to minimize the variance of the annualized estimated generating cost.
This system expansion model is capable of considering the locations of new generation and
transmission and also of choosing the right mixture of generating technologies.
The global tendency is to move from regulated power systems to deregulated power
systems. Power pool electricity markets, assuming that the independent system operator
is concerned with the social cost minimization, face great uncertainties from supply and
demand bids submitted by market participants. In power pool electricity markets, ran-
domness in the cost and benefit functions through random demand and supply functions
has never been considered before. This thesis considers as random all the coefficients of
the quadratic cost and benefit functions and uses the mean variance Markowitz theory to
minimize the social cost variance. The impacts that this risk minimization technique has
on nodal prices and on the elasticities of the supply and demand curves are studied.
All the mathematical models in this thesis are exemplified by the six-node network
proposed by Garver in 1970, by the 21-node network proposed by the IEEE Reliability
Test System Task Force in 1979, and by the IEEE 57- and 118-node systems.
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gk,et,h Capacity of et effectively used at h for all k; in MW.
gk,m,et Capacity of et effectively used in each m for all k; in MW.
gk,m,et,h Capacity of et effectively used in each m at h for all k; in MW.
gm,nt Capacity of nt effectively used in each m; in MW.
gm,nt,p Capacity of nt effectively used in each m at p; in MW.
gk,m,nt,p Capacity of nt effectively used in each m at p for all k; in MW.
gtm,et Capacity of et effectively used in each m at t; in MW.
gm,et Capacity of et effectively used in each m at t; in MW.
ntnt Integer variable. Number of new generators of nt installed at t; dimensionless.
nnt Integer variable. Number of new generators of nt; dimensionless.
xviii
nnt,p Integer variable. Number of new generators of nt at p; dimensionless.
ni-j Integer variable. Number of circuits added in the right-of-way between i and j;
dimensionless.
wtnt Total capacity of nt made available at t; in MW.
δm,ν Nodal angle at ν for all m; in radians.
δk,ν Nodal angle at ν for all k; in radians.
δk,m,ν Nodal angle at ν for all k,m; in radians.
δν Nodal angle at ν; in radians.
ρs Price at the slack node; in $/MWh.
Symbology:
( · ), ( · ) Maximum and minimum value for ( · ).
|( · )| Cardinality of the finite set ( · ).
et+, nt+ equals |Et|, |Nt|, respectively.
m+ equals |M| − (|M| − m).
E{( · )} Expected value of ( · ); same units as ( · ).
σ2( · ) Variance of ( · ); squared units of ( · ).
σ( · ) Standard deviation of ( · ); same units as ( · ).




Electric power systems, regardless whether they are under a centralized or a liberalized
regime, are exposed to a number of variations from various random events. The general
meaning of uncertainty is the inability to accurately predict random events [1]. This
inability to predict such random events is the one that introduces risk into power system
economics.
Power system operation can be divided into two major functions: power system dy-
namics and power system economics. Power system dynamics covers time windows that
range from fractions of a second to many minutes. The three components of power system
dynamics, and their time intervals in brackets, are: i) transient stability (cycles to ten
seconds), ii) dynamic stability (one to ten seconds), and iii) long-term dynamics (seconds
to minutes). Power system economics covers time windows ranging from several minutes
to several years. The functions covered by power system economics are: i) corrective con-
trol actions (real time), ii) economic dispatch (five to ten minutes), iii) unit commitment
(one day to one week), iv) hydrothermal coordination (short-range, one day to one week;
long-range, one week to one year [2]), v) pumped storage scheduling (one week), vi) fuel
purchases (months to years), vii) maintenance scheduling (one year), and viii) power sys-
tem planning (ten to thirty years) [3]. Figure 1.1 shows the time frame of power system
economics.
For the case of a vertically integrated industry—where the generation, transmission, and
distribution sectors are monitored and operated by the utility’s central control system—
1
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Figure 1.1: Functions covered by power system economics.
power system planning is the one that faces greater uncertainty. Since the planning for
generation and transmission expansion ranges anywhere in between ten to thirty years,
random events such as load growth, cost of capital, capital cost of new equipment, devel-
opment of new technologies, cost of fuel, taxes, equivalent availabilities of the generating
units, transmission capacity factors of the transmission lines, and even regulatory inter-
vention introduce risk into the planning period [3].
For the case of a liberalized electricity industry—where the generation, transmission,
and distribution sectors are owned and operated independently—the pool electricity market
faces uncertainty from the suppliers’ and consumers’ bids submitted to the Independent
System Operator (ISO).
Acknowledging the presence of risk is not enough; mathematical models that minimize
risk are needed. To incorporate the effects of these sources of uncertainty into an optimiza-
tion model, one can use a combination of random variables, stochastic programming, and
probabilistic constraints. To minimize the effects of the risk caused by uncertainty, one
can use any risk minimization technique such as the minimum variance approach devised
by H. M. Markowitz in 1952 and widely used in financial engineering.
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1.1 Centralized Power System Planning
Planning decisions made in the past affect the performance of power systems now, and
planning decisions taken now will affect the performance of power systems in the future.
Since power systems are expected to keep on growing as time goes, mainly because of
technological advancement and population growth, power system planning is a key factor
in long-term power system economics. Power system planning has to be done in such a
way that the reliability of the system is not compromised. When to invest, how much
capacity to add, what type of generation is needed, and where to locate new transmis-
sion lines and generating units are important decisions in power system planning [4]. In
any decision making process, there are multiple choices which, in turn, produce multiple
outcomes. Decisions can be made under three different situations: i) under certainty,1 ii)
under uncertainty,2 and iii) under risk3 [5, 6].
Power system planning is a multiple attribute decision making problem and, due to its
long-term nature, all the investments made are irreversible [7]. The regulated electricity
industry is concerned with the simultaneous minimization of various criteria such as the
present worth of all future costs (including operating cost); cash flow deficiencies; environ-
mental impacts on air, water, and land; probability of not meeting the forecasted demand;
and social impacts of new construction. The challenge is that, most of the time, these
different minimization criteria are inconsistent, i.e., a plan that minimizes one does not
minimize any of the others [3].
In the regulated electricity industry, generation and transmission expansion are carried
out by the same agent. Motivated by quantity, not by price, and based on forecasted levels
of demand, the system planner chooses the optimal investment levels of various types of
power plants. After a generation plan is set, transmission expansion is carried out with the
advantage of knowing the opening and closing of generating stations. Hence, investments in
power system expansion are sequential in practice [8,9]. Usually, a constrained optimization
approach is chosen in order to minimize the investment cost while avoiding load shedding
1No randomness, future is assumed to be fully and perfectly known.
2Multiple foreseeable scenarios; their probabilities are known or estimated over a particular period of
time. Use of random variables.
3Risk minimization is incorporated.
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and maintaining system reliability.
There are two types of transmission investments. The first type of network investment
comes from enhancement/maintenance decisions on the existing network; these investments
may include the addition, replacement, or upgrade of elements like: i) relays and switches,
ii) remote monitoring and control equipment, iii) transformers, iv) substation facilities, v)
capacitor banks, vi) conductors on existing links, and vii) voltage levels on transmission
links. The second type of network investment, the one this work is concerned with, involves
the building of new transmission lines in either existent or new rights-of-way [10].
The first step in generation and transmission expansion planning is to evaluate as
many alternatives as possible. Some of these are the various possible configurations of
new transmission lines and/or generating plants. To do this at a reasonable computational
expense, the modeling has to be simplified. As the planning solution narrows just to a few
possibilities, the modeling accuracy can be increased, i.e., by including AC power flows,
losses, stability studies, transient analysis, line design studies, and so forth [4]. The models
presented in this work are intended to narrow the planning solutions.
1.2 Pool Electricity Markets
Since the appearance of the first decentralized power systems, Chile in 1982 and England
in 1991, much effort has been focused on the short-term period of power system economics
and on how to encourage competition among market participants. Most of the work has
been done under the strong assumption of having a perfectly known future. However,
in real life, many of the events involved in the market clearing process are random. For
instance, unpredictable changes in fuel prices can affect the variable generating cost of
suppliers, and changes in the economy can affect the price responsiveness of the demand.
These random events not only influence the random variables in the model—like power
flows, generation, and demand levels—but also the Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs).
The inability to accurately predict these random variations introduce risk into the market
clearing process. The greatest source of uncertainty, or risk, in a pool electricity market
comes from the coefficients of the quadratic cost and benefit functions.
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1.3 Research Motivation
Most of the work that has been done in generation and transmission expansion for a verti-
cally integrated industry has been done in a deterministic way. Although the majority of
the referenced work acknowledges the stochastic nature of the generation and transmission
expansion problem, none has tried to develop a joint stochastic model for generation and
transmission expansion. Stochastic models have considerable advantages over determinis-
tic ones. One of these advantages is that the overall cost, investment and operational costs,
is lower than the overall cost of its deterministic counterpart and that the stochastic model
can meet the requirements for all the foreseeable scenarios, something that a deterministic
model cannot do.
Developing stochastic models is not enough. As stated before, the inability to perfectly
predict random events introduce risk into the planning process. Hence, an optimization
model that minimizes the risk from these random events is needed. The mean-variance
Markowitz theory can easily be applied; by means of a single risk factor in the objective
function, one can explicitly account for the trade-offs between the mean and the variance.
For the case of pool electricity markets, it is of paramount importance to develop
stochastic models. Since LMPs are one of the main components in computing important
parameters used in deregulated power system planning, it is needed to explore the effects
that risk minimization techniques have on them. It is also important to explore how the
elasticities of the supply and demand curves are affected by one’s position toward risk.
For the decentralized generation expansion case, profit-maximizing market participants
invest in new generation based on their expectation of energy prices, return on new invest-
ments, and demand growth. Therefore, generation expansion is motivated by price; the
revenues, based on LMPs, have to cover the capital and operating costs [11, 12]. When
load faces real-time prices and is elastic enough, high energy prices indicate high levels of
demand, and tight competitive supply and demand conditions. This, in turn, provides an
incentive to invest in new generation [13]. Hence, a more accurate computation of LMPs
that accounts for the uncertainty present in the supply and demand curves is needed.
For the decentralized transmission expansion case, there are numerous proposals in the
literature about how one should provide incentives to invest in new transmission. Some
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of these are spatial variations of LMPs [14, 15], Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs)
[10, 16, 17], and congestion costs [18] – [20]. If spatial variations of LMPs or FTRs are
to be used as an incentive for decentralized transmission expansion, then again it would
be better if the LMPs were computed taking into account the minimization of the risk
introduced by the random supply and demand curves. For the case of congestion costs,
since they are computed based on the assumption that the supply curves represent the
true marginal costs, and that the demand curves represent the true willingness to pay,
once more it would be better if the randomness in their parameters is taken into account.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organized in five chapters and three appendices.
Chapter 2 takes a deterministic approach on how centralized power system planning is
carried out. All the foundations are laid in order to formulate the generation and trans-
mission expansion problem as an optimization model. A new model for joint generation
and transmission expansion is also presented.
In Chapter 3, a stochastic approach on centralized power system planning is taken.
Random events such as demand levels, equivalent availabilities of generating units, and
transmission capacity factors of transmission lines are considered. The mean-variance
Markowitz theory is introduced as a risk minimization technique. The use of probabilistic
constraints is also explained to account for randomness on the coefficients of some of
the constraints. Three new models are presented; one for generation expansion, one for
transmission expansion, and one for joint generation and transmission expansion. These
models are mixed-integer nonlinear optimization programs.
Chapter 4 opens with some comments on decentralized power system planning and de-
fines some economic terms used in this chapter. Afterwards, the mean-variance Markowitz
theory is applied to the clearing process of a pool electricity market. All the coefficients
of the cost and benefit functions are considered as random. A thorough analysis on the
effects that one’s position toward risk has on supply/demand levels, LMPs, and elasticities
of the supply and demand curves is also made.
Finally, Chapter 5 presents a summary on the contributions of this work and gives
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directions for future research.
Appendix A gives some background on stochastic programming. Appendix B explores
the possibility that generation and transmission expansion projects be considered as com-
petitors rather than as interchangeable options. Appendix C presents the system’s data
for all the numerical examples presented in this work. In Appendix D, to further validate
the models presented in this thesis, two large scale systems are solved; the one is a 57-node
system and the other is a 118-node system.
Chapter 2
Centralized Power System Planning:
A Deterministic Approach
Centralized planning in a vertically integrated industry plans for both generation and
transmission expansion. The common practice is that after a generation plan is set, trans-
mission expansion planning is carried out. In this sense, it can be said that generation
and transmission expansion “go walking hand in hand” since, by the time the transmission
planning is made, the location and timing for new generating units, and the closing of old
ones, is perfectly known. A deterministic approach to centralized power system planning
assumes that the future is either perfectly known, or it can be perfectly predicted. Hence,
all the forecasted parameters, like future demand, are fixed known values.
For the generation expansion case, the system planner decides the optimal investment
levels from various types of power plants; he has to choose from among different technolo-
gies. Therefore, generation expansion is motivated by quantity and relies on internalizing
these quantity decisions [21, 22]. For the transmission expansion case, the system planner
determines the timing, siting, and number of new circuits to be added. In both cases,
the cost of the expansion is then passed on to the consumers who are charged a regulated
tariff [23,24].
Since the vertically integrated electricity industry plans for both generation and trans-
mission, they can be considered as a complement of each other and in fact be combined
into a single planning methodology. When generation expansion planning is combined with
8
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transmission expansion planning, the main objective is to decide whether to invest in new
generation, new transmission, or a combination of both to ensure no load curtailment while
minimizing the variable generating cost. In the following sections, this is formulated as a
deterministic single-stage mixed-integer nonlinear programming problem.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 explains the use of the Load Duration
Curve (LDC) in single nodal point generation planning, and when the transmission network
is considered. Capacity-based screening curves are discussed in order to explain how the
fixed and variable costs of a generating unit are obtained. The annual equivalent value
method is used to compute these costs. A simple static model is used to understand the
rationale behind generation expansion planning. Afterwards, a multistage model is stated
and fully explained. Finally, this multistage model is simplified into a single-stage model.
In Section 2.2, a linearized version of the AC power flow, the DC power flow, is obtained.
Using the DC power flow, a single-stage transmission expansion model is formulated. This
model assumes a fixed capacity factor for the generating units, i.e., only one operating
mode. Section 2.3 combines the generation and transmission expansion problems into one
single optimization model. The mixed-integer optimization model considers the various
operating modes represented by the LDC and incorporates the transmission network using
the DC model. Finally, Section 2.4 gives some concluding remarks.
2.1 Deterministic Generation Expansion
In this section, the basis are laid in order to formulate the deterministic generation ex-
pansion problem. Based on some of the most common models for generation expansion,
a multistage generation expansion model is stated and fully explained. At the end of this
section, the multistage model is simplified into a single-stage generation expansion model
for the vertically integrated electricity industry.
2.1.1 The Load Duration Curve
The demand for electricity varies over time. LDCs are used to represent the operating
conditions of a power system over time as long as the interest is only in the total capacity
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needed to meet future demands. LDCs are obtained from the hourly data of power demand
over a period of time.
The LDC plots the number of hours (percentage of hours per year) that the load equals
or exceeds a given level of demand (MW). An LDC can be thought as the probability of
finding load above a certain level. It is customary to show on the vertical axis of this curve
the load, and on the horizontal axis the duration either in hours or as a percentage of the
hours per year. The amount of energy to be generated by each unit equals the area under
the curve. A typical load duration curve is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Typical load duration curve.
In [2], an example on how to construct a piecewise LDC is shown. A piecewise approx-
imation of the LDC is shown in Figure 2.2.
The LDC is used in the short-run to determine the optimal dispatch of generation
capacity. In the long-run, the LDC is used to decide the optimal level of investment in
new generation, the type of power plant, and the number of each type [25]. The LDC can
be used in generation expansion planning when all the load and all the generating units
are assumed to be connected at the same node (single nodal point generation planning),
or under the assumption that there is one LDC per major interconnecting node. In the
case of the single nodal point generation planning, the geographical factor and the cost of
transmission are ignored. The single nodal point generation planning is suitable when the
power system is either strong or spans over a small region [26]. Load can be represented
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Figure 2.2: Piecewise approximation of the load duration curve.
over a year (8760 hrs), over the life cycle of the generating plants, or over the representation
of two typical days per month (576 hrs) [4, 5]. By observing the LDC, it can be seen that
load is made up of a constant component (load that is always present) and a fluctuating
component (load that varies over time). The constant component is the base load demand
while the fluctuating component is made up of the mid load demand and the peak demand.
Note that, to satisfy the demand, some plants run all the time (base load plants), others
run about half the time (mid load plants), while others only run for a short period of time
during the high load demand (peaking plants). Peaking plants, like gas-fired combustion
or internal combustion units, have low fixed costs and high operating costs; base load
plants, like nuclear, hydroelectric, or coal fired units, have high fixed costs but very low
operating costs; and mid load plants, like old coal-fired or oil-fired units, are somewhere
in between. The capacity factor of a generating plant is determined by the load it serves.
The capacity factor is defined as the percentage of hours of the year a generating plant
serves a load [21,22,27].
2.1.2 Economic Assessment Methods
Economic assessment methods are used as a tool to select an optimal investment scheme
when many technologies are available to choose from. There are three different types of
economic assessment methods: i) the static assessment method, which ignores the time
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value of money; ii) the dynamic assessment method, which considers the time value of
money; and iii) the stochastic assessment method, which considers the time value of money
and uncertainty in some of the parameters. By using the probability distribution function
of the uncertain variables, a probabilistic analysis approach can be used with the stochastic
assessment method to valuate the profit of an investment.
When the time value of money is to be taken into consideration, one must bring all the
cash flow in different time frames to the same time frame, i.e., a payment in the future
at the end of the year n and a set of yearly instalments for n years can be brought to the
present in order to compare them.
The annual equivalent value method converts all the cost during the lifetime of a plant
(or the duration of the planning period) into an annual cost and then compares all the






where i is the discount rate.
Once this is done, the annuities can be obtained using
A = P
i(1 + i)n
(1 + i)n − 1 , (2.2)
where A is the annual value [26].
2.1.3 Screening Curves
Screening curves can be used to identify the fixed and variable costs for a given generating
unit as a function of the capacity factor. As mentioned before, the capacity factor is
the percentage of the hours in the year that a generator serves a load, consequently, the
capacity factor is determined by the load. A screening curve plots the average cost vs. the
capacity factor. The two types of screening curves are: capacity-based and energy-based.
Capacity-based screening curves plot the average cost of using the capacity of the plant
and are represented with the curve ACCapacity = FC+cf×V C. This type of screening curves
can be used to determine optimal investment levels in different generating technologies
based on the optimal durations a certain technology should serve each operating mode.
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These curves can also be used to compare generation costs between different generating
technologies. Figure 2.3 shows a typical capacity-based screening curve.
Figure 2.3: Capacity-based screening curve.
From Figure 2.3, it can be seen that the capacity-based screening curve is formed by a
fixed component and a variable component. The fixed component is the investment cost.
Usually, the investment cost is annualized either over the plant life or the planning period.
The variable component is the variable operating cost whose biggest and most significative
part is the fuel cost. Since investment plans range from ten to thirty years, the annualized
fuel cost has to be levelized to take into account the effects of inflation. The uniform









(1 + i)n − 1 , (2.3)
where LAfc is the levelized annual fuel cost, fc is the fuel cost in the first year, a is the
inflation rate, i is the present worth rate, and n is the number of years of the levelization.
Equation (2.3) transforms an inflation series into annuities.
The following example shows how to obtain a capacity-based screening curve. Consider
a coal-fired generating unit with an investment cost of capacity of 1500 $/KW over a life
plant of twenty years. Assume a fuel cost of 2 $/MBtu, a heat rate of 9500 Btu/KWh, a
present worth rate of 10%, and a fuel price escalation of 6%.
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= 176.1894 $/KW-y = 0.1761894 M$/MW-y. (2.4)
During the first year, considering full time operation and with the fuel consumption
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= 0.16644 M$/MW-y. (2.5)
The uniform levelized annual fuel cost, using equation (2.3), is








(1 + 0.1)20 − 1
= (0.16644)(1.537)
= 0.2558 M$/MW-y. (2.6)
The capacity-based screening curve, from Equations (2.4) and (2.6), is
ACCapacity = 0.1761894 + cf × 0.2558 M$/MW-y. (2.7)
Energy-based screening curves show the average cost of the energy produced by a gener-
ating unit. They are represented by the curve ACEnergy =
FC
cf
+V C. Energy-based screening
curves are very useful when assessing alternative technologies (nuclear, wind, solar or the
like) in electricity markets. The capacity factors for alternative technologies are technical
dependant rather than market dependant. This is because their variable costs are usually
below the market price so they run whenever they are technically capable. To asses the
economics of alternative technologies, the average cost of energy is compared with the
average price of the market. Figure 2.4 shows a typical energy-based screening curve.
It is worth mentioning that when comparing several technologies using either the
capacity-based or the energy-based screening curves, both curves intersect at the same
point, that is, at the capacity factor at which one generating unit becomes more economi-
cal than the other. For a detailed discussion on screening curves please refer to [4, 22].
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Figure 2.4: Energy-based screening curve.
2.1.4 Static Model
Having a static deterministic model implies that decisions are made only once and the
future is assumed to be perfectly known. These type of models are the easiest to implement
and the computational effort required to solve them is minimum. Deterministic models
are helpful, though, to identify all the different aspects involved in generation expansion
planning. Assuming a single nodal point generation planing, i.e., omitting the transmission
network, one can identify three basic parameters. These are: i) the investment cost, ii)
the operating cost, and iii) the capacity factor. The generation expansion problem, using
the LDC, is to find the type of power plant (coal, gas, oil, nuclear, hydro, renewable and
so forth) that minimizes the total cost of producing 1 MW during the time T of each
operating mode (base, mid, and peak load). Assuming that there is no existing generation,
this can be mathematically represented as
min {rntxntnnt + cfmqntgm,nt} , ∀ nt,m, (2.8)
where m ∈ M, nt ∈ Nt, and rnt and qnt are obtained from capacity-based screening curves.
A logical result to (2.8), just by looking at the LDC, is to cover the base load demand
(large values of Tm) with equipment that has low operating cost but hight investment cost,
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and the peak load demand (small values of Tm) with equipment that has low investment
cost but high operating cost.
2.1.5 Multistage Model
When having in view long-term periods of investment, there are at least four reasons why
the generation expansion problem may be addressed as a multistage program: i) long-term
evolution of equipment costs, ii) long-term evolution of the load curve, iii) appearance
of new technology, and iv) obsolescence of currently available equipment [5]. Based on
the models in [5, 28], and ignoring the transmission network, the following multistage
deterministic model is proposed.
The objective function to be minimized, Equation (2.9), is made up of the investment
cost in new generating units and the generating cost of existing and newly installed gen-























The installed capacity constraint, Equation (2.10), describes the actual installed capac-





nt, ∀ nt, t. (2.10)
The peak demand constraint, Equation (2.11), establishes that the capacity of the ex-
isting and newly installed generating units, affected by their equivalent availability, must










nt ≥ P t, ∀ t. (2.11)
Equation (2.12) shows the power balance constraint. It establishes that the power
generated by the existent and newly installed generating capacity equals the power demand








m, ∀ m, t. (2.12)
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The budget constraint, Equation (2.13), places an upper limit in the fixed payments to





nt ≤ Bt, ∀ t. (2.13)
Equations (2.14) and (2.15) are the derated capacity constraints ; they place an upper
limit in the power generated at each stage by the existing and newly installed generating
units that takes into account their derated capacity. The capacity of any generating unit
is affected by its equivalent availability. Because of a component failure, or a similar
condition, the output of an unit may be reduced. This type of outage results in the derating
of the unit. The equivalent availability of a generating unit accounts for such derating
outages [4]. It is worth mentioning that generating capacity is defined as the potential to
deliver power. Consequently, it is measured in watts and there is no inconsistency in units
∑
m
(gtm,nt) − αntwtnt ≤ 0, ∀ nt, t, (2.14)
∑
m
(gtm,et) − αetytet ≤ 0, ∀ et, t. (2.15)
The relationship between indices and sets is as shown in Equation (2.16)
et ∈ Et; m ∈ M; nt ∈ Nt; t ∈ T . (2.16)
The fact that ytet can be updated at every stage accounts for changes in the existing
capacity, i.e., the decommissioning of some units. If it is assumed that the planning period
is less than the lifetime of the existing equipment, then ytet remains unchanged.
It is worth mentioning that, in a stochastic model, there is a difference between stages
and periods. In a two-stage stochastic model, the first stage decisions (investment decisions)
are deterministic here-and-now decisions that do not change. The second stage decisions
(operational decisions) are reactions to these fist stage decisions. However, each stage can
be composed of several periods. For instance, if the whole planning period for the capacity
expansion problem is made up of 36 months, the first stage is composed, say, of 6 months
while the second stage is composed of 30 months. A Multistage model is needed if it is
foreseen that the investment decisions need to be adjusted in the future.
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2.1.6 Single-Stage Model
The following single-stage model is formulated as a benchmark in order to compare deter-


















Note that the parameters qet, qnt, and rnt in Equation 2.17 are obtained from capacity-based
screening curves using the annual equivalent value method. Note also that in Equation
(2.17), the annualized fixed cost of existing technology does not appear. This is because
that is a fixed constant value dependant solely on the existing generating capacity, therefore






















(gm,nt) − αntxntnnt ≤ 0, ∀ nt, (2.21)
∑
m
(gm,et) − αetyet ≤ 0, ∀ et. (2.22)
The relationship between indices and sets is shown in Equation (2.23)
et ∈ Et; m ∈ M; nt ∈ Nt. (2.23)
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2.2 Deterministic Transmission Expansion
The goal of transmission expansion in a vertically integrated electricity industry is to
minimize the operating cost of the existing generating units, and the investment cost in
new transmission while meeting operational constraints. This section presents the basis for
deterministic transmission expansion. A DC power flow model is used in order to formulate
a single-stage deterministic optimization model.
2.2.1 AC Power Flow in a Transmission Line
Power is defined as the rate of flow of energy. Since power is a flow, it is measured in watts.
Consider the π equivalent circuit for long and medium transmission lines shown in Figure
2.5. The complex power, Si-j, that flows in the transmission line that connects Node i to
Node j is
Si-j = Pi-j + jQi-j, (2.24)
where Pi-j is the active power and Qi-j is the reactive power.
Figure 2.5: π circuit for transmission lines.
The active power that flows from Node i to Node j is
Pi-j = Gi-j
[
|Vi|2 − |Vi||Vj| cos(δi − δj)
]
− Γi-j|Vi||Vj| sin(δi − δj), (2.25)
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where Gi-j = |Yi-j| cos θi-j and Γi-j = |Yi-j| sin θi-j are the conductance and the susceptance
of the transmission line i-j, respectively; Vi = |Vi| cos(δi) + j|Vi| sin(δi) is the voltage at
Node i; and Vj = |Vj| cos(δj) + j|Vj| sin(δj) is the voltage at Node j.
The reactive power that flows from Node i to Node j is
Qi-j = Γi-j
[
−|Vi|2 + |Vi||Vj| cos(δi − δj)
]
− Gi-j|Vi||Vj| sin(δi − δj) − |Vi|2|BCap|, (2.26)
where BCap = |BCap| sin(θCap), and θCap = π2 [29].
The relationship between the admittance and the impedance is Yi-j = Z
−1
i-j . From com-














A linearized version of the AC power flow—the DC power flow—dropping Equation
(2.26) and keeping Equation (2.25), can be obtained under the assumption that the power
angle (δi − δj) is small in magnitude, and the voltage magnitudes at the sending and
receiving nodes are 1 p.u. If (δi − δj) is small one gets
cos(δi − δj) ≈ 1, (2.29)
sin(δi − δj) ≈ δi − δj. (2.30)
Under the previous assumptions, Equation (2.25) becomes
Pi-j = −Γi-j(δi − δj). (2.31)
Combining Equations (2.28) and (2.31), and assuming that the resistance of the line
is negligible, one gets the linearized version of the active power that flows from Node i to




(δi − δj). (2.32)
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2.2.2 Single-Stage Model
The single-stage deterministic model presented in this section is based on the initial work by
Garver [30], who used linear programming to solve a transportation model for transmission
expansion, and Villasana et al. [31], who used linear programming to solve a model which
combined DC power flows with the transportation model. The model in [32] and [33],
with some modifications, can be applied in a vertically integrated industry. It is assumed
that the rights-of-way where new lines can be built are given. The proposed single-stage
deterministic model is described next.
The objective function, Equation (2.33), minimizes the investment cost in new trans-
mission lines and in the annualized variable production cost with an assumed fixed capacity








The nodal balance constraint is shown in Equation (2.34)
Sf + g = d. (2.34)
The budget constraint, shown in Equation (2.35), imposes an upper limit on the invest-
ment to be made each year in new transmission lines
∑
i-j
ci-jni-j ≤ B. (2.35)
Equation (2.36) shows the power flow constraint for each transmission line; notice the
nonlinearity due to the multiplication of integer variables with continuous variables
fi-j − Γi-j(n0i-j + ni-j)(δi − δj) = 0, ∀ i-j. (2.36)
Equations (2.37) and (2.38) are the transmission line capacity constraints. The power
loading of a transmission line depends, among other things, on thermal limits. Thermal
limits are used to avoid damaging the conductor due to annealing and to avoid excessive
sag [4]
fi-j ≤ (n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j, ∀ i-j, (2.37)
−fi-j ≤ (n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j, ∀ i-j. (2.38)
Chapter 2. Centralized Power System Planning: A Deterministic ... 22
Stability limits are used to limit the power angle between sending and receiving nodes.
In uncompensated lines, it is common practice to limit the power angle to a value no
greater than 45◦ [34]. The stability constraint is shown in Equation (2.39)
− 1
4
π ≤ (δi − δj) ≤
1
4
π, ∀ i-j. (2.39)
The derated capacity constraint is shown in Equation (2.40)
get,h − αetyet,h ≤ 0, ∀ et, h. (2.40)
Upper and lower limit constraints can be added to limit the values of some variables of
the model such as the number of circuits to be added in each right-of-way, the capacity of
each generator that is effectively used, and the nodal angles at each bus. These constraints
are shown in Equations (2.41)–(2.43)
0 ≤ ni-j ≤ ni-j ∀ i-j, (2.41)
get,h ≥ 0 ∀ et, h, (2.42)
−2π ≤ δν ≤ 2π, ∀ ν. (2.43)
Equation (2.44) shows the relationship between indices and sets
et ∈ Et; h ∈ H; h, i, j, ν ∈ N ; i-j ∈ I; H, I ⊂ N . (2.44)
2.3 Deterministic Generation and Transmission
Expansion
As stated before, a vertically integrated industry plans for both generation and transmis-
sion expansion. Consequently, a joint model that plans for both at the same time can
be implemented. This section combines the two models for generation and transmission
expansion in a single-stage optimization model; the model assumes that there is one LDC
per node and includes the transmission network using a DC model.
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2.3.1 Single-Stage Model
If one wants to combine into one single optimization model the generation and transmis-
sion expansion problem, then one is interested in minimizing the investment cost in new
transmission lines and in new generating units as well as in the generation cost of existing
and newly installed generating capacity [35]. The following optimization model accounts
for the different operating modes present in the LDC while incorporating the transmission



























rntxntnnt,p ≤ B. (2.46)
Unlike before, the budget constraint now considers an upper limit in the investment to be




(gm,nt,p) − αntxntnnt,p ≤ 0, ∀ nt, p, (2.47)
∑
m
(gm,et,h) − αetyet,h ≤ 0, ∀ et, h. (2.48)
Nodal balance constraint
Sfm + gm = dm, ∀ m. (2.49)
Power flow constraint
fm,i-j − Γi-j(n0i-j + ni-j)(δm,i − δm,j) = 0, ∀ m, i-j. (2.50)
Notice the nonlinearity due to the multiplication of integer variables with continuous vari-
ables.
Transmission line capacity constraints
fm,i-j ≤ (n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j, ∀ m, i-j, (2.51)
−fm,i-j ≤ (n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j, ∀ m, i-j, (2.52)




π ≤ (δm,i − δm,j) ≤
1
4
π, ∀ m, i-j. (2.53)
Upper and lower limit constraints
0 ≤ ni-j ≤ ni-j, ∀ i-j, (2.54)
gm,et,h ≥ 0, ∀ m, et, h, (2.55)
gm,nt,p ≥ 0, ∀ m,nt, p, (2.56)
−2π ≤ δm,ν ≤ 2π, ∀ m, ν. (2.57)
Relationship between indices and sets
et ∈ Et; h ∈ H; h, i, j, p, ν ∈ N ; i-j ∈ I; m ∈ M; nt ∈ Nt; p ∈ P; H, I,P ⊂ N . (2.58)
2.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presents deterministic models for generation, transmission, and generation
and transmission expansion. The goal is to identify all the modelling parameters in order to
build more complex stochastic models and to have a benchmark to compare the stochastic
models presented in Chapter 3. The main contribution of this chapter is the joint single-
stage mixed-integer nonlinear program for generation and transmission expansion shown
in Section 2.3.1. This model includes the transmission network using a DC model and
assumes that there is one LDC per node. Hence, several operating modes (as many as
there are in the linearized LDC) can be considered in order to choose the right mixture of
generating technologies.
Chapter 3
Centralized Power System Planning:
A Stochastic Approach
Planning for the real life is full of random events. The longer the period over which these
events are forecasted, the greater the risk. One can shield against risk by implementing
stochastic models, using probabilistic constraints, and applying risk minimization tech-
niques. In centralized power system planning, the greatest source of uncertainty comes
from the inability to accurately predict the demand levels. Stochastic models can be im-
plemented in order to plan for all the foreseeable levels of demand. When planning for
generation and transmission expansion, it is important to consider randomness in param-
eters such as the equivalent availability factors of generating units and the transmission
capacity factors of transmission lines. These can be done by using probabilistic constraints.
In order to minimize the risk, the mean-variance Markowitz theory can be implemented.
This chapter builds on the deterministic models presented in Chapter 2 and presents
stochastic models for generation, transmission, and generation and transmission expansion
for the vertically integrated industry. By means of numerical examples, the superiority of
stochastic models with risk over deterministic models is stressed. Concepts such as the
Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI) and the Value of the Stochastic Solution
(VSS) are introduced as ways of quantifying uncertainty.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 introduces the general concept of
the mean-variance Markowitz theory. In Section 3.2, the deterministic equivalent of a
25
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probabilistic constraint for the particular case of a normally distributed random variable
is obtained. Section 3.3 introduces the concepts of the VSS and the EVPI as a way
of quantifying the importance of randomness. In Section 3.4, a multistage stochastic
model for generation expansion is first introduced. Afterwards, using the block separability
property of the multistage model, a two-stage stochastic model is obtained. Using the
mean-variance Markowitz theory and probabilistic constraints, a two stage stochastic model
that minimizes risk and accounts for the randomness of the equivalent availability factors is
proposed. Some numerical examples are given. In Section 3.5, the transmission expansion
problem is stated as a two-stage stochastic program. Like in Section 3.4, a risk parameter is
introduced in the objective function and probabilistic constraints are included to account
for the random equivalent availabilities and the random transmission capacity factors.
The concepts of the VSS and the EVPI are illustrated by solving a six-node system. In
Section 3.6, the two-stage stochastic programs for generation and transmission expansion
are merged into a single optimization problem. The most complete model is a mixed-
integer nonlinear program that includes risk minimization and probabilistic constraints.
In this section, a six- and a 21-node systems1 are solved and the VSS and EVPI are also
obtained. Finally, Section 3.7 gives some concluding remarks.
3.1 Mean-Variance Markowitz Theory
Harry M. Markowitz developed the minimum variance portfolios theory in which the ob-
jective is to minimize the variance of the rate of return for a fixed expected rate of return.
This approach makes the trade-offs between the mean and the variance explicit [36] – [38].
The variance of any random variable gives information about how far, or how wrong [1],
that variable is from its mean. Large variance values imply that the random variable most
likely will be far off from its mean incurring then in greater risk. Hence, the minimum
variance approach can be viewed as a way of minimizing the risk in an investment project.
Minimizing the risk (minimizing the variance) implies higher cost. In order to account for
risk in a two-stage stochastic model,2 a risk factor along with the variance are incorporated
1A 57- and a 118-node system are presented in Appendix D.
2For a detailed discussion on stochastic models, please refer to Appendix A.
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into the objective function as follows [39]:
min f(x) + E{f(y)} + θrσ2f(y), (3.1)
where f(x) is the first-stage decision (deterministic part), E{f(y)} is the expected value
of the second-stage decision (stochastic part), and σ2f(y) is the variance of the second-stage
decision. The parameter θr is a risk parameter and is chosen by the decision maker; it
weighs the importance that the minimization of the variance has in the objective function.
The higher the value of θr, the more important the minimization of the variance.
The variance term in Equation (3.1) can be replaced by the standard deviation as long
as θr is properly scaled.
3.2 Probabilistic Constraints
Some constraints in a stochastic program may be relaxed in the sense that they may not
need to hold surely ; instead, they may need to hold almost surely, say, with a reliability
level. These constraints are known as probabilistic constraints. The general formulation
for a single chance constraint is
Pr{A(ξ̃)x ≥ h(ξ̃)} ≥ α, (3.2)
where 0 < α < 1 is the minimum acceptable probability for meeting the constraint.
To incorporate probabilistic constraints into a recourse problem, i.e., the two-stage
stochastic problem with fixed recourse, they first need to be transformed into their deter-
ministic equivalents. The deterministic equivalent for the specific case of a single prob-
abilistic constraint when A(ξ̃) is a standard normally distributed random variable and
h(ξ̃) = 0 is
Āx − Φ−1(α)
√
xT Cx ≥ 0, (3.3)
where Ā is the mean value of A(ξ̃), C is the covariance matrix, and Φ−1(α) is the α-quantile3
of A(ξ̃). Please note that Equation (3.3) is only valid under these assumptions [5].
3For a random variable ξ, η is its α-quantile if and only if η = min{x | F (x) ≥ α} where 0 < α < 1 and
F (x) is the cumulative distribution function.
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3.3 Quantifying the Importance of Randomness
There are two values of interest when solving stochastic problems that can quantify the
importance of randomness. One is the value of the stochastic solution (VSS) and the other
is the expected value of perfect information (EVPI).
The VSS is defined as the difference between the expected result of using the Expected
Value Solution (EEV) and the objective function value of the stochastic problem consider-
ing all the possible scenarios (Stochastic Solution, SS, also referred as the here-and-now
solution). The EEV is obtained from solving the stochastic problem, but considering the
aggregate-level decisions fixed to the results obtained by the deterministic model with the
average demand (expected values) [5, 40], that is
VSS = EEV − SS. (3.4)
The VSS is the cost of ignoring uncertainty in choosing a decision [5]; in other words,
it computes the benefit of knowing the distributions of the stochastic variables [40].
The EVPI represents the loss of profit due to the presence of uncertainty or, in other
words, measures the maximum amount a decision maker would be ready to pay in return
for complete and accurate information about the future [5]. The EVPI measures the value
of knowing the future with certainty [40]. The EVPI is the difference between the stochastic
solution (SS) and the Wait and See Solution (WSS). The WSS is the mean value of all the
deterministic solutions for each one of the expected values, that is
EVPI = SS − WSS. (3.5)
3.4 Stochastic Generation Expansion
The random long-term evolution of equipment cost, the long term uncertainty in the evo-
lution of the LDC, the uncertainty on the appearance of new technologies, and the obso-
lescence of the existent equipment are enough reasons to justify a multistage stochastic
program to model the generation expansion problem. In the model shown in Section 2.1.5,
a number of variables can be considered as random. To give an example: the evolution of
equipment cost introduces randomness in the parameter rtnt; evolution of fuel cost as well
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as other costs related with the production of energy also make the parameters qtnt and q
t
et
random; even the equivalent availabilities, αnt and αet, can be considered random since
some plants may not deliver their nominal output due to a derated outage which is totally
unpredictable. Another highly random parameter is the load Ltm for each operating mode.
This leads to the formulation of the problem as a multistage stochastic model.
3.4.1 Multistage Model
Without any loss of generality, assume that only the levels of demand Ltm are random
4
and that the probabilities of their occurrences as well as their expected values are known.
Under these assumptions, the total capacity of new technology available at each stage wtnt,
the capacity of new and existing technology effectively used gtm,nt and g
t
m,et, and the new
generating capacity added xntn
t
nt, become random variables dependent on the random
vector ξt whose elements are the different levels of demand Ltm. Taking the expectation
with respect to the random vector ξ = (ξ2, . . . , ξ|T |), where the elements forming ξt are
the demands (Lt1, . . . ,L
t


















































m, ∀ m, t. (3.9)
4Only in this section and the following, bold font notation is used to indicate dependance on the random
outcome ω, i.e., below average, average, and above average level of demand.










(gtm,nt) − αntwtnt ≤ 0, ∀ nt, t, (3.11)
∑
m
(gtm,et) − αetytet ≤ 0, ∀ et, t. (3.12)
Indices and sets
et ∈ Et; m ∈ M; nt ∈ Nt; t ∈ T . (3.13)
However, making some simplifications and assumptions, the generation expansion prob-
lem can be transformed into a two-stage stochastic problem.
3.4.2 Two-Stage Model
The problem in (3.6)–(3.13) has a property known as block separable recourse. This prop-
erty makes possible to transform a multistage stochastic program with fixed recourse into
a two-stage stochastic program with fixed recourse. A multistage stochastic program has
block separable recourse when the decision vectors can be split into aggregate-level deci-
sions and detailed-level decisions.5 The block separable recourse property implies that the
detailed-level variables have no direct effect on future constraints or, in other words, it
implies that the linkage between consecutive stages is weak. The aggregate-level variables
can be grouped together and sent into the first stage. The first stage is then composed
of the aggregate-level decisions while the second stage is composed of the detailed-level
decisions. Because of this separation, a multistage stochastic problem can be transformed
into a two-stage stochastic problem.
In the generation expansion problem, it is assumed that future demands do not depend
on the past, i.e., having high levels of demand during several previous consecutive stages
does not necessarily imply that the demand in the following stages will be high too. Ca-
pacity carried over from stage t − 1 to stage t is not affected by the demand in stage t.
Therefore, the decision to install new generating capacity, xntn
t
nt, in the future does not
5Please refer to Appendix A for a detailed discussion.
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depend on the outcomes up to stage t. Decisions on the amount of capacity to be installed
can be made at the beginning of the planning period; consequently, the future only involves
reactions to these decisions. The same xntn
t
nt must be optimal for any realization of ξ.
The only remaining stochastic decisions, gtm,et and g
t
m,nt, are in the operation-level; these





nt, can be pulled together into the first stage while the detailed-level
decisions, gtm,et and g
t
m,nt, can be pulled together into the second stage [5].
The objective function6 of the two-stage stochastic model with fixed recourse is obtained
by carrying the aggregate-level decisions into the first stage and taking the expectation over
















































where prk is the probability of occurrence of scenario
7 k, K is the set of all foreseeable
scenarios, and k ∈ K.
The two-stage stochastic program with fixed recourse is formally stated in Equations
(3.16)–(3.22); it ignores the transmission network, i.e., single nodal point generation plan-
ning. This model considers randomness in the levels of demand (right hand side) through
the consideration of a number of foreseeable scenarios. The variables no longer depend on
T ; the random variables are now dependant on K.
6From now onward, the bold font notation is dropped in order to avoid cumbersome notation.
7It is assumed that a scenario is a possible occurrence that is given; this work is not concerned with
the technique used to generate these scenarios.






































(gk,m,nt) − αntxntnnt ≤ 0, ∀ k, nt, (3.20)
∑
m
(gk,m,et) − αetyet ≤ 0, ∀ k, et. (3.21)
Indices and sets
et ∈ Et; m ∈ M; nt ∈ Nt; k ∈ K. (3.22)
3.4.3 Deterministic Model vs. Two-Stage Stochastic Model
This section presents a numerical example that highlights the superiority of a two-stage
stochastic model over a single-stage deterministic model for generation expansion in a
vertically integrated industry.
The following assumptions are made: The transmission network is ignored. There are
two existing generating units and there are three different technologies to choose from.
The planning period is shorter than the life time of either the existing or new plants. The
LDC is obtained over a typical year, that is, over 8760 hours. Three operating modes are
considered: base, mid, and peak load demand. Each operating mode has three possible
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foreseeable scenarios: below, average, and above average demand. The expected values of
the equivalent availabilities, αet and αnt, are used. The budget constraint is not binding.
All the pertinent data is given in Appendix C.
The decision maker has to guess what the future demand would be. If a conserva-
tive approach is used, the decision maker invests for the average levels of demand. If a
pessimistic approach is used, the decision maker invests for the above average levels of
demand. Of course, a pessimistic approach implies higher investment cost but it satisfies
the demands for the three different scenarios, although not in an economical way. If the
decision maker wishes to save as much as possible in the investment, then he invests for
the below average levels of demand. To show how cost varies depending on the levels of
demand used in the investment plan, the single-stage deterministic generation expansion
problem, shown in Equations (2.17)–(2.23), is solved8 for each one of the three different
foreseeable scenarios. The results are shown in Tables 3.1–3.3. For the below average level
of demand, one unit of technology two is built. For the average level of demand, one unit
of technology one is built. For the above average level of demand, one unit of technology
one and one unit of technology two are built.
Table 3.1: Deterministic gen. exp., below average.
Operating Mode† et nt
1 3 2
B‡ 462.5 0.0 17.5
M⋆ 0.0 101.0 79.0
P∗ 0.0 80.0 0.0
Overall Cost: $155.877 M.
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
An alternative to solve this problem, is to take into account the probabilities of occur-
rence of the three possible scenarios by solving the two-stage stochastic model with fixed
8The models in this section are implemented in the optimization software GAMS using the MINOS
solver [42].
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Table 3.2: Deterministic gen. exp., average.
Operating Mode† et nt
1 3 1
B‡ 222.5 0.0 317.5
M⋆ 240.0 0.0 0.0
P∗ 0.0 0.0 140.0
Overall Cost: $206.4916 M.
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
Table 3.3: Deterministic gen. exp., above average.
Operating Mode† et nt
1 3 1 2
B‡ 162.5 0.0 437.5 0.0
M⋆ 300.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
P∗ 0.0 78.5 25.0 96.5
Overall Cost: $246.169 M.
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
recourse shown in Equations (3.16)–(3.22). The solution satisfies the three possible levels
of demand and, hopefully, is cheaper than the pessimistic approach. The solution of the
stochastic model is shown in Table 3.4. The stochastic solution is to build one unit of
technology one and two units of technology two.
From the results it can be seen that the new capacity installed satisfies the three levels
of demand and, comparing the overall costs,9 $20.655 M are saved with respect to the
deterministic solution for the above average level of demand. The results also suggest the
decommissioning of the existing 200 MW of technology three.
9The overall cost equals the investment cost plus the expected variable generating cost.
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Table 3.4: Stochastic generation expansion.
Operating Mode† et nt
Below Average 1 3 1 2
B‡ 382.5 0.0 97.5 0.0
M⋆ 0.0 0.0 180.0 0.0
P∗ 80.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Average
B‡ 462.5 0.0 77.5 0.0
M⋆ 0.0 0.0 240.0 0.0
P∗ 0.0 0.0 140.0 0.0
Above Average
B‡ 462.5 0.0 137.5 0.0
M⋆ 0.0 0.0 300.0 0.0
P∗ 0.0 0.0 25.0 175.0
Overall Cost: $225.514 M.
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
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3.4.4 Two-Stage Model with Risk
In the generation expansion problem where risk minimization is introduced by means of
the mean-variance Markowitz theory, the interest is in the minimization of the investment
cost in new generation, the expected annualized production cost, and the variance of the
annualized production cost. An investor that chooses a solution with low variance but high
annualized production cost, is said to be risk averse (large values of θr). An investor that
chooses a solution with high variance but low annualized production cost, is said to be risk
preferring (small values of θr) [43].
The variance of z, as defined in Equation (3.14), is [6]































From Equations (3.1), (3.15), and (3.23), the objective function of the two-stage stochas-
tic model incorporating the variance and the risk parameter is shown in Equation (3.24);




















































It can be shown that, by varying the risk parameter θr, a wide range of solutions can
be obtained. The value of the risk parameter is to be chosen by the decision maker. The
risk parameter θr weighs the importance that the minimization of the variance as a risk
measure has. The larger the value of θr, the smaller the risk. Smaller risk implies higher
cost. In Table 3.5, some solutions are generated for different values of θr.
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Table 3.5: Annualized generating cost, θr varies, gen. exp.
Risk Parameter Mean† Std. Deviation† Overall Cost‡
θr = 0.00 125.045 21.735 211.895
θr = 0.03 128.134 18.633 214.984
θr = 0.04 129.920 17.79 216.770
θr = 0.05 132.791 15.275 219.641
θr = 0.06 136.679 12.729 223.529
θr = 0.10 144.457 7.637 231.307
† in $M-y; ‡ Investment cost plus annualized generating cost, in $M-y.
From the results one can observe that as the risk aversion increases, the overall cost
increases and the standard deviation decreases.10
10The square root of the variance is the standard deviation. Therefore,
√
σ2z = σz is the standard
deviation.
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3.4.5 Two-Stage Model with Risk and Probabilistic Constraints
To consider randomness in the equivalent availability of the generating plants, one can
incorporate probabilistic (chance) constraints to the two-stage stochastic model. The der-
ated capacity constraints, Equations (3.20) and (3.21), can be modified so they hold almost
surely with a specific reliability level. Assuming that the equivalent availability factor is









2 ≤ 0, ∀ k, nt, (3.25)
∑
m





2 ≤ 0, ∀ k, et. (3.26)
The parameter βg is the α-quantile of the standard normally distributed random variables
αet and αnt, assuming they are of the same technology. The value of βg depends on the
minimum desired probability of satisfying the random (chance) constraints, i.e., if βg equals
1.75, the probabilistic constraints are met with at least a 96% probability. As in the case
of θr, the decision maker is responsible for choosing the value βg.
Note that, if the variances of αnt and αet are known, Equations (3.25) and (3.26) can
be linearized. Hence, the linearized constraints are
∑
m
(gk,m,nt) − αntxntnnt + βgσαntxntnnt ≤ 0, ∀ k, nt, (3.27)
∑
m
(gk,m,et) − αetyet + βgσαetyet ≤ 0, ∀ k, et. (3.28)
In Table 3.6, some solutions for the model represented by Equations (3.24), (3.17)–
(3.19), (3.22), (3.27), and (3.28) are shown. The parameter θr is fixed to a value of 0.05
while βg is allowed to vary. It can be seen that as the probability of meeting the chance
constraints increases, the overall cost also increases.
For different values of θr, and keeping βg fixed to a value of 1.3 (at least a 90% probabil-
ity the chance constraints are met), the mean and the standard deviation of the annualized
generating cost are obtained. The values are presented in Table 3.7. It can be observed
that a risk averse attitude implies higher investment and operational costs.
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Table 3.6: Annualized generating cost, βg varies, gen. exp.
Probability Mean† Std. Deviation † Overall Cost‡
≈ 76%; βg = 0.7 146.652 15.275 249.822
≈ 84%; βg = 1.0 153.248 15.275 264.578
≈ 90%; βg = 1.3 160.200 15.275 279.690
≈ 96%; βg = 1.74 175.078 15.275 302.728
† in $M-y; ‡ Investment cost plus annualized generating cost, in $M-y.
Table 3.7: Annualized generating cost, θr varies, gen. exp.
Risk Parameter Mean† Standard Deviation† Overall Cost‡
θr = 0.00 144.704 32.043 260.084
θr = 0.03 154.502 16.428 269.882
θr = 0.04 154.366 19.094 273.856
θr = 0.05 160.200 15.275 279.690
θr = 0.06 164.089 12.729 283.529
θr = 0.10 171.866 7.637 291.356
† in $M-y; ‡ Investment cost plus annualized generating cost, in $M-y.
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3.5 Stochastic Transmission Expansion
When planning an expansion in a transmission network, a decision maker faces the same
dilemma as when expanding generation. The level of demand is highly uncertain; to
provide a safe operation of the power system, the decision maker might adopt a pessimistic
approach and expand for the highest level of demand expected to happen, incurring then
in high investment costs. This situation calls for the implementation of stochastic models.
In the following sections, like it is done in the case of generation expansion, the trans-
mission expansion problem is stated first as a two-stage stochastic program, then it is
extended to incorporate risk in the objective function, and finally probabilistic constraints
are added to consider randomness in the transmission capacity factors of the transmission
lines.
3.5.1 Two-Stage Model
In this section, a two-stage stochastic model with fixed recourse is formulated for the trans-
mission expansion problem. This stochastic model considers uncertainty in the demand
side; it has as first-stage decisions the investment in new transmission, and as second-stage
decisions the annual estimate of generation in order to minimize the annualized variable
production cost11 of the existing generating plants based on the transmission capacity
added. The second stage objective can be thought as the minimization of the expected










The two-stage stochastic model for transmission expansion in a vertically integrated
industry is formally stated next.
11A fixed capacity factor for each generating plant is assumed.














ci-jni-j ≤ B. (3.33)
Power flow constraint
fk,i-j − Γi-j(n0i-j + ni-j)(δk,i − δk,j) = 0, ∀ k, i-j. (3.34)
Transmission line capacity constraints
fk,i-j ≤ (n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j, ∀ k, i-j, (3.35)




π ≤ (δk,i − δk,j) ≤
1
4
π, ∀ k, i-j. (3.37)
Derated capacity constraint
gk,et,h − αetyet,h ≤ 0, ∀ k, et, h. (3.38)
Upper and lower limit constraints
gk,et,h ≥ 0, ∀ k, et, h, (3.39)
0 ≤ ni-j ≤ ni-j, ∀ i-j, (3.40)
−2π ≤ δk,ν ≤ 2π, ∀ k, ν. (3.41)
Indices and sets
et ∈ Et; h ∈ H; h, i, j, ν ∈ N ; i-j ∈ I; k ∈ K; H, I ⊂ N . (3.42)
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3.5.2 Deterministic Model vs. Two-Stage Stochastic Model
In this section, a numerical example for transmission expansion in a vertically integrated
industry is presented; it shows the advantages that a stochastic model has over a determin-
istic model. The VSS and the EVPI are also obtained. It is assumed that the generating
capacity remains constant over the planning period. The system to be expanded is the
classic test system proposed by Garver in 1970; it is shown in Figure 3.1 [30,44].
Figure 3.1: Six-node system to be expanded.
Three possible scenarios are considered: below average, average, and above average
level of demand. It is assumed that one can add up to five new transmission lines between
the pair of nodes that already have an interconnection. There are also two new rights-
of-way between Node 6 and Node 2, and between Node 6 and Node 4 in which five new
transmission lines can be built. Assume that the budget constraint is not binding. The
expected value of the equivalent availability factor of the generating units is used. All the
data is shown in Appendix C.
First, taking Node 1 as the slack12 node, the deterministic transmission expansion
12Also known as the swing bus; a definition taken from [45] is: “One bus, known as slack or swing bus,
is taken as reference where the magnitude and phase angle of the voltage are specified. This bus makes
up the difference between the scheduled loads and generated power that are caused by the losses in the
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problem shown in Equations (2.33)–(2.44) is solved13 for each one of the three different
foreseeable scenarios. Tables 3.8–3.13 show the results for the below average, average, and
above average levels of demand. For the below average level of demand, one new line is
built between Nodes 1 and 5, and 2 and 6; while two new lines are built between Nodes
4 and 6. For the average level of demand, two new transmission lines are built between
Nodes 1 and 5, and 4 and 6; and one new transmission line between Nodes 3 and 5, and 2
and 6. For the above average level of demand, two new transmission lines are built between
Nodes 1 and 5, and 4 and 6; and one new transmission line between Nodes 1 and 2, and 2
and 6.
Table 3.8: Deterministic, trans. exp., generation, six-node system, below.
Scenario Generation†
Below Average 1 3 6
370.0 0.0 370.0
† in MW; total cost: $210.569M.
Table 3.9: Deterministic, trans. exp., power flows, six-node system, below.
Scenario Power Flow†
Below Average pf1−2 pf1−4 pf1−5 pf2−3
63.6 37.4 178.9 31.1
pf2−4 pf2−6 pf3−5 pf4−6
−7.5 −100.0 −68.9 −180.0
† in MW; total cost: $210.569M.
network.”
13The models in this section are implemented in the optimization software GAMS using the MINOS
solver [42].
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Table 3.10: Deterministic, trans. exp., generation, six-node system, average.
Scenario Generation†
Average 1 3 6
550.0 0.0 370.0
† in MW; total cost: $282.083M.
Table 3.11: Deterministic, trans. exp., power flows, six-node system, average.
Scenario Power Flow†
Average pf1−2 pf1−4 pf1−5 pf2−3
87.2 62.1 280.6 −10.6
pf2−4 pf2−6 pf3−5 pf4−6
5.9 −78.1 −140.6 −171.9
† in MW; total cost: $282.083M.
Since the average level of demand is most likely to happen, a decision maker might
invest in the solution for the average level of demand. This expansion might be able to
support the load for the below average demand scenario but might not support, at least
not economically, the load for the above average demand scenario. Expanding the system
for the solution of the above average level of demand, might support the load for the three
different scenarios but at a high and uneconomical cost of $362.063 M. Taking a scenario
analysis approach, for a given level of demand, one can calculate the worst that could
happen—in terms of all the objectives—and then choose a solution that minimizes the value
of the worst-case loss. This should single out some point that is optimal in a pessimistic
minimax sense. An expansion project capable of meeting the highest foreseeable level of
demand may turn out to be a quite expensive solution in the long run [46]. Once more, a
better approach is to take into account the randomness of the stochastic variables. Tables
3.14 and 3.15 show the results for the stochastic model shown in Equations (3.31)–(3.42)
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Table 3.12: Deterministic, trans. exp., generation, six-node system, above.
Scenario Generation†
Above Average 1 3 6
675.5 54.5 370.0
† in MW; total cost: $362.063M.
Table 3.13: Deterministic, trans. exp., power flows, six-node system, above.
Scenario Power Flow†
Above Average pf1−2 pf1−4 pf1−5 pf2−3
180.5 76.7 268.3 7.2
pf2−4 pf2−6 pf3−5 pf4−6
24.7 −54.4 −98.3 −168.6
† in MW; total cost: $362.063M.
taking into consideration the randomness on the demand side. The expansion consists
on the building of one transmission line between Nodes 1 and 2, two transmission lines
between Nodes 1 and 5, and three transmission lines between Nodes 6 and 4.
It is easily seen that taking into account the randomness in the demand side produces
a transmission expansion plan that supports the three foreseeable levels of demand but at
an economical cost of $288.117 M. This implies savings of about $74 M with respect to the
deterministic above average level of demand solution. Once more, the best solution that a
decision maker can take is to use a stochastic model.
To obtain the VSS, the solution of the stochastic model is used. It is also needed to
solve the stochastic model again but with the values for the new transmission added, ni-j,
fixed to the result obtained by the deterministic solution with the average level of demand.
The EEV solution is shown in Tables 3.16 and 3.17.
From Equation (3.4), the VSS is
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Table 3.14: Stochastic, trans. exp., generation, six-node system.
Scenario Generation†






† in MW; total cost: $288.117M.
EEV = $291.6854 M, (3.43)
VSS = EEV − $288.117 M
= $3.5684 M. (3.44)
This means that, by considering the random variations, the investment in building new
transmission lines is $288.117 M instead of $291.6854 M; which means that $3.5684 M are
saved.
To compute the EVPI, it is needed to obtain first the WSS; the WSS is the mean value
of all the deterministic solutions for each one of the foreseeable levels of demand.
From Equation (3.5), the expected value of perfect information is
WSS = (0.3 × $210.569 M) + (0.4 × $282.033 M) + (0.3 × $362.063 M)
= $284.623 M, (3.45)
EVPI = $288.117 − WSS
= $3.4942 M. (3.46)
If it were possible to know the future demand perfectly, the cost would be $284.623 M
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Table 3.15: Stochastic, trans. exp., power flows, six-node system.
Scenario Power Flow†
Below Average pf1−2 pf1−4 pf1−5 pf2−3
104.9 −7.0 182.1 27.9
Average
156.4 27.3 240.0 23.6
Above Average
190.9 58.2 270.0 −0.9






† in MW; total cost: $288.117M.
instead of $288.117 M, saving up to $3.4942 M. Since it is impossible to know the future
demands in advance, the best that can be done is to take the SS as the best result.
These results show that the stochastic model, taking into account the randomness in
the stochastic variables, is a good approximation since it is not too far from the result
obtained by the WSS.
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Table 3.16: EEV solution, trans. exp., generation, six-node system, average.
Scenario Generation†






† in MW; total cost: $291.685M.
Table 3.17: EEV solution, trans. exp., power flows, six-node system, average.
Scenario Power Flow†
Below Average pf1−2 pf1−4 pf1−5 pf2−3
50.1 30.8 199.2 10.8
Average
87.2 62.1 280.6 −10.6
Above Average
97.1 80.0 247.4 −72.9
Below Average pf2−4 pf2−6 pf3−5 pf4−6
−3.9 −96.8 −89.2 −183.2
Average
5.9 −78.1 −140.6 −171.9
Above Average
22.9 −52.9 −77.4 −167.1
† in MW; total cost: $291.685M.
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3.5.3 Two-Stage Model with Risk
A risk parameter can be incorporated into the objective function of the two-stage stochas-
tic model for transmission expansion using the mean-variance Markowitz theory. From

















Using Equations (3.30) and (3.47), the new objective function of the two-stage stochas-






























the constraints remain as in Equations (3.32)–(3.42).
Just like before, the risk parameter θr weighs how important the minimization of the
variance as a risk measure is. Table 3.18 shows some results as θr varies. As the risk
aversion increases, the standard deviation decreases, and the overall cost increases.
Table 3.18: Annualized generating cost, θr varies, trans. exp., six-node system.
Risk Parameter Mean† Std. Deviation† Overall Cost‡
θr = 0.00 270.617 56.815 288.117
θr = 0.01 279.745 46.050 297.245
θr = 0.02 289.146 36.2904 306.646
θr = 0.03 305.674 25.458 323.174
θr = 0.07 327.896 10.910 347.646
θr = 0.08 329.980 9.547 349.730
† in $M-y; ‡ Investment cost plus annualized generating cost, in $M-y.
Chapter 3. Centralized Power System Planning: A Stochastic... 50
3.5.4 Two-Stage Model with Risk and Probabilistic Constraints
In the transmission expansion problem, not only the equivalent availability for each generat-
ing plant can be considered as random; the transmission capacity factor of the transmission
lines is random too. The actual capacity of a transmission line depends on exogenous en-
vironmental parameters and other contingencies such as random outages and discretional
security constraints implemented by the system operator. Consider Path 15 that connects
Northern and Southern California. The capacity of this link varies between 2,600 MW and
3,950 MW depending upon ambient temperature and remedial action schemes that are
in place to respond to unanticipated outages of generating plants and other transmission
lines [13].
To include these two random parameters into the two-stage stochastic model, three
probabilistic constraints are added; one for the equivalent availability of the generating
units αet, and two for the random transmission capacity factor αi-j. As before, it is
assumed that the mean and the variance of these parameters are known and that they are
standard normally distributed random variables.
Probabilistic transmission line capacity constraints








, ∀ k, i-j, (3.49)








, ∀ k, i-j. (3.50)
Probabilistic derated capacity constraint





2 ≤ 0, ∀ k, et, h. (3.51)
In Equations (3.49)–(3.51), βg and βt are the α-quantile of the standard normally
distributed random variables αet and αi-j, respectively. The parameters βg and βt are
chosen by the decision maker. Equations (3.49)–(3.51) are linearized next:
fk,i-j ≤ αi-j(n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j − βtσαi-j(n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j,∀ k, i-j, (3.52)
−fk,i-j ≤ αi-j(n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j − βtσαi-j(n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j,∀ k, i-j, (3.53)
gk,et,h − αetyet,h + βgσαetyet,h ≤ 0, ∀ k, et, h. (3.54)
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Table 3.19 shows some results when θr is fixed to a value of 0.02 and βt is allowed to
vary. Table 3.20 shows some results when θr is fixed to a value of 0.02 and βg is allowed
to vary. Notice that as the probability of meeting the chance constraints increases, the
investment and annualized generating costs also increase.
Table 3.19: Annualized generating cost, βt varies, trans. exp., six-node system.
Probability Mean† Standard Deviation † Overall Cost‡
≈ 76%; βt = 0.7 291.532 37.632 309.032
≈ 84%; βt = 1.0 296.100 38.188 313.600
≈ 90%; βt = 1.3 289.146 36.290 310.646
≈ 96%; βt = 1.74 289.146 36.290 310.646
† in $M-y; ‡ Investment cost plus annualized generating cost, in $M-y.
Table 3.20: Annualized generating cost, βg varies, trans. exp., six-node system.
Probability Mean† Standard Deviation † Overall Cost‡
≈ 76%; βg = 0.7 320.122 40.438 332.372
≈ 84%; βg = 1.0 331.632 45.708 345.482
≈ 90%; βg = 1.3 351.082 38.188 367.182
≈ 96%; βg = 1.74 369.006 40.857 382.106
† in $M-y; ‡ Investment cost plus annualized generating cost, in $M-y.
For different values of θr, and keeping βg and βt fixed to a value of 1.3 (at least a 90%
probability the chance constraints are met), the mean and the standard deviation of the
annualized generating cost are obtained. The results are presented in Table 3.21. Notice
that as θr increases, the overall cost increases and the variance of the annualized generation
cost decreases.
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Table 3.21: Annualized generating cost, θr varies, trans. exp.,six-node system.
Risk Parameter Mean† Standard Deviation† Overall Cost‡
θr = 0.00 144.704 32.043 260.084
θr = 0.03 154.502 16.428 269.882
θr = 0.04 154.366 19.094 273.856
θr = 0.05 160.200 15.275 279.690
θr = 0.06 164.089 12.729 283.529
θr = 0.10 171.866 7.637 291.356
† in $M-y; ‡ Investment cost plus annualized generating cost, in $M-y.
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3.6 Stochastic Generation and Transmission
Expansion
In this section, the stochastic generation and transmission expansion models are combined
into one single model. First, a two-stage stochastic model is formulated in order to account
for the randomness in the demand levels. After that, a risk parameter is introduced into
the objective function using the mean-variance Markowitz theory. Finally, probabilistic
constraints are added to account for the randomness in the equivalent availability factors
and in the transmission capacity factors. The most complete model is a mixed-integer
nonlinear optimization problem. Two systems are solved to exemplify the models: a six-
and a 21-node system.
3.6.1 Two-Stage Model
In this two-stage stochastic model, the first-stage decisions are the investment in new
generation and transmission while the second stage decision is the annual estimate of
generation in order to minimize the annualized generation cost of the existing and possible
new generating plants based on the expansion made. Consequently, the second stage

















































In the two-stage stochastic model presented next, the investment cost in new transmis-
sion lines and in new generating units as well as the expected value of the generation cost
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of existing and newly installed generating capacity are minimized. The new objective func-
tion is shown in Equation (3.57). The budget constraint, Equation (2.46), and the upper
and lower limit constraint for the new circuits to be added in each right-of-way, Equation
(2.54), remain as in the deterministic model. All the other constraints are modified to take
























(gk,m,nt,p) − αntxntnnt,p ≤ 0, ∀ k, nt, p, (3.58)
∑
m
(gk,m,et,h) − αetyet,h ≤ 0, ∀ k, et, h. (3.59)
Nodal balance constraint
Sfk,m + gk,m = dk,m, ∀ k,m. (3.60)
Power flow constraint
fk,m,i-j − Γi-j(n0i-j + ni-j)(δk,m,i − δk,m,j) = 0, ∀ k,m, i-j. (3.61)
Transmission line capacity constraints
fk,m,i-j ≤ (n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j, ∀ k,m, i-j, (3.62)




π ≤ (δk,m,i − δk,m,j) ≤
1
4
π, ∀ k,m, i-j. (3.64)
Upper and lower limit constraints
gk,m,et,h ≥ 0, ∀ k,m, et, h, (3.65)
gk,m,nt,p ≥ 0, ∀ k,m, nt, p, (3.66)
−2π ≤ δk,m,ν ≤ 2π, ∀ k,m, ν. (3.67)
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Indices and sets
et ∈ Et; h ∈ H; h, i, j, p, ν ∈ N ; i-j ∈ I;
k ∈ K; m ∈ M; nt ∈ Nt; p ∈ P; H, I,P ⊂ N . (3.68)
3.6.2 Deterministic Model vs. Two-Stage Stochastic Model
This section compares the deterministic models vs. the stochastic models by means of a
six- and a 21-node system.
A Six-Node System
Consider first a six-node system. It is a modification of the system shown in Section 3.5.2.
In the system shown in Figure 3.2, one can add up to five new transmission lines between
the pair of nodes that already have an interconnection. There are also two new rights-of-
way between Node 6 and Node 2, and between Node 6 and Node 4 in which up to five new
transmission lines can be built. There are three generators located at Nodes 1, 3, and 6,
all of which are of different technologies. New generation can be added at Nodes 2 and 4,
and there are three different technologies to choose from. The parameters for the existing
and new transmission lines, as well as for the installed and new generating capacity are
given in Appendix C. It is assumed that the budget constraint is not binding and Node 1
is taken as the swing bus.
At every node there are three different operating modes: i) base, ii) mid, and iii) peak.
Without any loss of generality, it is assumed that each operating mode at every node has
the same duration. Each operating mode has three forecasted levels of demand: i) below
average, ii) average, and iii) above average. These forecasted levels of demand are known to
happen with 30%, 40%, and 30% probability, respectively. All the pertinent data appears
in Appendix C.
By solving14 the deterministic model shown in Equations (2.45)–(2.58) for each one of
the three foreseeable levels of demand, one can see that the cost varies depending on which
level of demand is used in the investment plan. For instance, for the below average level
14All models presented in this section are implemented in the optimization software GAMS using the
SBB solver.
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Figure 3.2: Six-node system to be expanded.
of demand the total cost is $151.161 M, for the average level of demand the total cost is
$202.272 M, and for the above average level of demand the total cost is $250.074 M.
The other approach to solve this problem, the stochastic approach, is to take into
account the probabilities of all the possible different levels of demand (possible scenarios).
The solution, shown in Tables 3.22 and 3.23, is obtained by solving the model shown in
Equations (2.46), (2.54), and (3.57)–(3.68). The total cost is now $209.674 M; by building
a new transmission line between Nodes 1 and 5, 2 and 3, 2 and 6, 3 and 5, and one
new generator of technology two at Node 4, the three foreseeable levels of demand are
satisfied and $40.4 M are saved with respect to the result obtained for above average level
of demand.
To obtain the EVPI, it is needed first to compute the WSS, which is the mean value
of all the deterministic solutions for each one of the foreseeable levels of demand. This is
shown in Equation (3.69).
WSS = (0.3 × $151.161M) + (0.4 × $202.272M) + (0.3 × $250.074M)
= $201.279M. (3.69)
From Equation (3.5), the EVPI is $8.395 M. If it were possible to know in advance the
future demand, the cost would be $201.279 M instead of $209.674 M, saving up to $8.395
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Table 3.22: Stochastic, gen. & trans. exp., generation, six-node system.
Operating Mode† Generator
Below Average 1 3 4 6
B‡ 448.9 31.1 0.0 0.0
B‡ + M⋆ 460.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 460.0 150.0 110.0 20.0
Average
B‡ 462.5 69.3 8.2 0.0
B‡ + M⋆ 462.5 124.0 183.5 10.0
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 462.5 206.7 230.8 20.0
Above Average
B‡ 462.5 96.7 40.8 0.0
B‡ + M⋆ 462.5 275.7 131.8 30.0
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 462.5 289.5 289.4 58.5
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
M. Since it is impossible to know the future demand in advance, the best that can be done
is to take the SS as the best result. These results show that the stochastic model, taking
into account the probabilities of all the foreseeable scenarios, is a good representation of
the uncertainties faced by the investment plan since the result obtained by the SS is not
too far from the result obtained by the WSS.
To compute the VSS, one first needs to obtain the EEV. When trying to compute the
EEV, the problem becomes infeasible. Since the VSS is the cost of ignoring uncertainty,
one can add a set of slack variables in the nodal balance constraint to provide for any
generation deficiency. Also, these slack variables need to be included in the objective
function; each with a weighing coefficient that is at least greater than the most expensive
annualized variable generating cost. This is equivalent to assume that there is generating
capacity available at each bus ready to be used in the presence of a contingency but at a
greater cost. Hence, the EEV can be redefined as the solution of the stochastic problem,
but considering the number of new generating units and new transmission lines added fixed
to the results obtained by the deterministic model for the average level of demand plus the
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Table 3.23: Stochastic, gen. & trans. exp., power flows, six-node system.
Operating Mode† Power Flow
Below Average pf1−2 pf1−4 pf1−5 pf2−3 pf2−4 pf2−6 pf3−5
B‡ 97.8 71.6 200.0 −71.1 8.9 80.0 −120.0
B‡ + M⋆ 100.0 80.0 190.0 −110.0 20.0 90.0 −100.0
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 100.0 80.0 190.0 −130.0 20.0 70.0 −80.0
Average
B‡ 99.8 72.7 200.0 −89.3 9.2 90.0 −110.0
B‡ + M⋆ 98.5 54.0 200.0 −104.0 −17.5 100.0 −90.0
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 99.2 43.2 200.0 −136.7 −34.2 100.0 −60.0
Above Average
B‡ 99.2 63.3 200.0 −96.7 −4.2 100.0 −100.0
B‡ + M⋆ 91.9 80.0 160.6 −176.3 28.1 100.0 −30.6
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 91.5 28.8 192.2 −151.7 −48.3 91.5 −22.2
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
cost of providing for any energy deficiency. In this numerical example, there is a deficiency
of 600 MW for the base load mode and of 34.2 MW for the peak load mode of the above
average level of demand. Under the assumption that the annualized variable generating
cost of providing for any energy deficiency at every node is 1 $M/MW-y, the EEV is
$227.6820M. Therefore, form Equation (3.4), the VSS is $18.008M.
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A 21-Node System
This twenty-one-node system is a modification of the reliability test system proposed by the
IEEE Reliability Test System Task Force [47] in 1979. In the system shown in Figure 3.3,
one can add two new transmission lines between Nodes 2 and 4, and Nodes 2 and 6; three
new transmission lines between Nodes 3 and 13; and six new transmission lines between
Nodes 9 and 11, 9 and 12, 10 and 11, and 10 and 21. There is a mix of 13 generators of
four different technologies. New generation can be added at Nodes 2, 11, 13, 14, and 21,
and there are four different technologies to choose from. The parameters for the existing
and new transmission lines, as well as for the installed and new generating capacity are
given in Appendix C.
Like in the six-node system, at every node there are three different operating modes,
each of which has three forecasted levels of demand. These forecasted levels of demand
happen with 30%, 40%, and 30% probability, respectively. Appendix C gives all pertinent
data.
Solving the deterministic model for each one of the three foreseeable levels of demand,
one gets a total cost of $483.498 M, $664.737 M, and $815.467 M for the below average,
average, and above average levels of demand, respectively.
Using the stochastic approach, one gets the solution shown in Tables 3.24 and 3.25 at
a total cost of $679.8 M. The expansion consists on the building of a new transmission line
between Nodes 2 and 4, 2 and 6, 9 and 11, 10 and 21, one new generator of technology one
at Node 2, one new generator of technology three at Node 13, and two new generators of
technology four at Node 2. The three foreseeable levels of demand are satisfied and $135.667
M are saved with respect to the result obtained for above average level of demand. The
expected value of perfect information is $24.2157 M.
Chapter 3. Centralized Power System Planning: A Stochastic... 60
Figure 3.3: 21-node system to be expanded.
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Table 3.24: Stochastic, gen. & trans. exp., generation, 21-node system.
Operating Mode† Node
Below Average 1 2 7 11 13 14 16 19 20 21
B‡ 0.0 421.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 181.5 370.0 277.5 0.0
B‡ + M⋆ 138.8 503.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.4 370.0 370.0 277.5 311.6
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 138.8 688.8 211.6 0.0 138.7 138.7 370.0 370.0 277.5 515.9
Average
B‡ 19.4 546.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 286.9 370.0 277.5 0.0
B‡ + M⋆ 138.8 666.0 0.0 0.0 107.2 0.0 370.0 370.0 277.5 470.6
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 167.1 693.8 289.5 393.1 138.7 138.7 370.0 370.0 277.5 581.6
Above Average
B‡ 82.2 625.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 370.0 370.0 277.5 0.0
B‡ + M⋆ 138.7 689.0 145.8 0.0 138.8 138.8 370.0 370.0 277.5 491.4
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 177.3 723.4 289.5 561.7 529.8 138.8 370.0 370.0 277.5 495.1
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
Chapter 3. Centralized Power System Planning: A Stochastic... 62
Table 3.25: Stochastic, gen. & trans. exp., power flows, 21-node system.
Operating Mode† Power Flow
Below Average pf1−2 pf1−5 pf1−3 pf2−4 pf2−6 pf3−9 pf3−13 pf4−9 pf5−10 pf6−10 pf7−8 pf8−9
B‡ −158.9 89.6 21.8 101.1 118.6 56.3 −113.2 68.6 58.3 58.6 −55.0 −69.3
B‡ + M⋆ −121.3 126.4 57.6 155.2 159.3 56.2 −124.6 103.2 76.4 63.3 −88.0 −99.7
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ −200.0 147.3 83.1 198.8 193.1 43.6 −140.0 124.7 76.1 56.3 86.2 −31.6
Average
B‡ −200.0 119.8 42.6 138.5 156.7 61.5 −113.4 99.5 82.3 84.7 −66.0 −81.2
B‡ + M⋆ −188.4 152.7 83.3 200.0 196.0 56.5 −124.4 137.6 92.7 80.8 −105.6 −115.0
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ −200.0 137.4 99.7 192.7 184.7 −7.2 −108.5 103.8 51.9 20.6 139.0 −21.0
Above Average
B‡ −200.0 151.1 65.6 174.3 192.3 65.9 −109.0 129.4 108.0 109.5 −75.9 −91.6
B‡ + M⋆ −198.3 151.2 81.1 200.0 196.8 51.2 −144.0 128.2 82.2 64.3 24.4 −61.0
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ −198.4 149.3 77.0 191.2 200.0 19.5 −190.3 88.9 51.0 11.2 116.4 −55.4
Below Average pf8−10 pf9−11 pf9−12 pf10−11 pf10−21 pf11−21 pf12−14 pf13−14 pf13−19 pf14−15 pf14−17 pf15−16
B‡ −60.7 79.3 −100.0 9.9 −38.7 −27.1 −185.0 68.9 −320.8 −361.9 202.0 −209.7
B‡ + M⋆ −108.3 31.5 −93.7 45.6 −150.2 −108.9 −229.7 17.6 −364.3 −419.2 165.6 −268.4
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ −53.2 20.9 −58.2 85.4 −200.0 −158.7 −252.0 12.7 −330.3 −353.7 153.5 −203.2
Average
B‡ −74.8 88.3 −100.0 21.7 −31.5 −29.5 −202.0 67.7 −347.6 −411.3 224.5 −259.0
B‡ + M⋆ −134.6 5.0 −72.3 70.5 −194.9 −147.6 −235.5 57.8 −341.4 −395.3 133.6 −243.3
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ −45.2 −178.2 45.5 −5.3 −200.0 −108.8 −187.0 −34.7 −314.6 −302.7 100.0 −153.7
Above Average
B‡ −87.8 94.9 −96.3 34.4 −22.0 −31.2 −213.6 67.1 −367.5 −448.1 241.2 −295.8
B‡ + M⋆ −80.2 23.2 −73.1 78.5 −200.0 −154.9 −260.8 21.0 332.6 361.9 164.3 −211.1
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ −64.2 −200.0 13.1 −69.4 −200.0 −73.5 −254.3 164.6 −261.6 −295.7 207.1 −140.8
Below Average pf15−20 pf16−19 pf17−18 pf18−21 pf19−20
B‡ −152.2 −174.5 122.0 65.8 −125.3
B‡ + M⋆ −150.8 −132.4 37.6 −52.4 −126.7
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ −150.5 −166.7 −28.9 −157.2 −127.0
Average
B‡ −152.3 −147.6 128.5 61.0 −125.2
B‡ + M⋆ −152.0 −154.1 −20.0 −128.0 −125.5
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ −149.0 −183.9 −118.9 −272.8 −128.5
Above Average
B‡ −152.4 −127.6 130.8 53.2 −125.1
B‡ + M⋆ −150.8 −164.1 −12.3 −136.5 −126.7
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ −155.0 −230.9 −44.7 −221.6 −122.5
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
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3.6.3 Two-Stage Model with Risk
To minimize the risk faced in the transmission and generation expansion problem, the
interest is focused in the minimization of the investment cost in new transmission and in
new generation, the expected annualized production cost, and in the minimization of the
variance of the annualized production cost.
The variance of z, as defined in (3.55), is































The objective function of the two-stage stochastic model that incorporates the variance
and the risk parameter is shown in Equation (3.71). All the constraints remain the same



















































3.6.4 Two-Stage Model with Risk and Probabilistic Constraints
Just like before, the derated capacity constraints can be modified to take into account a
random availability factor for the generating plants by means of a chance (probabilistic)
constraint. In like manner, the transmission line capacity constraints can be modified to
take into account a random transmission capacity factor. This is shown next.
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Probabilistic derated capacity constraints
∑
m





2 ≤ 0, ∀ k, nt, p, (3.72)
∑
m





2 ≤ 0, ∀ k, et, h. (3.73)
Probabilistic transmission line capacity constraints








,∀ k,m, i-j, (3.74)








,∀ k,m, i-j. (3.75)
Note that, if the variances of αnt and αi-j are known, Equations (3.72)–(3.75) can be
linearized. Therefore, the linearized equations are
∑
m
(gk,m,nt,p) − αntxntnnt,p + βgσαntxntnnt,p ≤ 0, ∀ k, nt, p, (3.76)
∑
m
(gk,m,et,h) − αetyet,h + βgσαetyet,h ≤ 0, ∀ k, et, h, (3.77)
fk,m,i-j ≤ αi-j(n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j − βtσαi-j(n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j,∀ k,m, i-j, (3.78)
−fk,m,i-j ≤ αi-j(n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j − βtσαi-j(n0i-j + ni-j)f i-j,∀ k,m, i-j. (3.79)
A Six-Node System
Consider the two-stage stochastic model described by Equations (3.71), (3.76)–(3.79),
(3.60), (3.61), (2.46), (2.54), and (3.64)–(3.68). Assume that the availability factor for
each generating plant and the transmission capacity factor for each transmission line are
standard normally distributed random variables.
The fist section of Table 3.26 shows some results for different values of θr when both βt
and βg are fixed to zero. From the first section of Table 3.26, just as expected, it can be
seen that as θr increases, the standard deviation decreases, and the overall cost increases.
Section two of Table 3.26 shows some results when θr = 0.03, βt = 0, and βg is allowed
to vary. Section three of Table 3.26 shows the results when θr = 0.03, βg = 0, and βt varies.
It can be seen that as the percentage of satisfying the probabilistic constraints increases,
the overall cost also increases. Finally, the last section of Table 3.26 shows the results
obtained when βg and βt are both fixed to a value of 1.3 (approximately 90% probability
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the chance constraints are met) and θr varies. Here it also can be observed the fact that a
lower standard deviation implies a higher overall cost.
A 21-Node System
As in the case of the six-node system, Table 3.27 shows different results when the pa-
rameters θr, βt, and βg take different values. It can be seen that as θr increases, the
standard deviation decreases, and the overall cost increases. It can also be seen that as
the percentage of satisfying the probabilistic constraints increases, the overall cost also
increases.
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Table 3.26: Annualized generating cost, gen. & trans. exp., six-node system.
Parameter Mean† Std. Deviation† Overall Cost‡
θr = 0.00 183.1240 39.3755 206.6740
θr = 0.01 190.5270 34.3488 208.3270
θr = 0.02 199.3320 24.2460 217.1320
θr = 0.03 184.1350 19.3914 213.8650
θr = 0.04 187.5800 16.6919 220.3100
θr = 0.10 201.7360 7.6376 231.4660
θr = 0.03, βt = 0
≈ 76%; βg = 0.7 139.5090 19.6373 233.8590
≈ 84%; βg = 1.0 147.1710 21.0679 241.5210
≈ 90%; βg = 1.3 156.8510 22.9015 256.9510
≈ 96%; βg = 1.74 223.9240 22.7380 278.1340
θr = 0.03, βg = 0
≈ 76%; βt = 0.7 132.4920 17.1334 236.0920
≈ 84%; βt = 1.0 134.2880 16.8008 235.6380
≈ 90%; βt = 1.3 125.7790 16.0178 235.6290
≈ 96%; βt = 1.74 131.1000 16.4021 236.9500
βg = 1.3, βt = 1.3
θr = 0.00 146.8630 33.1902 247.5130
θr = 0.01 148.0720 33.4241 246.4720
θr = 0.02 154.9880 15.6862 253.3880
θr = 0.03 158.5590 22.6046 256.9590
θr = 0.04 163.8580 19.0941 262.2580
θr = 0.10 181.3580 7.6377 279.7580
† in $M-y; ‡ Investment cost plus annualized generating cost, in $M-y.
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Table 3.27: Annualized generating cost, gen. & trans. exp., 21-node system.
Parameter Mean† Std. Deviation† Overall Cost‡
θr = 0.00 506.4300 93.7604 679.8000
θr = 0.01 546.9090 64.6354 701.3790
θr = 0.02 490.9730 38.1881 751.8830
θr = 0.03 510.4170 25.4588 771.3270
θr = 0.04 520.1390 19.0941 781.0490
θr = 0.10 537.6390 7.6376 798.5490
θr = 0.03, βt = 0
≈ 76%; βg = 0.7 562.6850 25.4588 858.1550
≈ 84%; βg = 1.0 563.6500 25.4588 943.2700
≈ 90%; βg = 1.3 614.8560 25.4588 947.1660
≈ 96%; βg = 1.74 706.1340 25.4588 1027.1940
θr = 0.03, βg = 0
≈ 76%; βt = 0.7 585.5910 25.4588 819.8610
≈ 84%; βt = 1.0 554.6780 25.4588 820.3580
≈ 90%; βt = 1.3 560.0070 25.4588 837.8970
≈ 96%; βt = 1.74 530.1170 25.4588 839.0570
βg = 1.3, βt = 1.3
θr = 0.00 593.7580 112.1040 875.3080
θr = 0.01 548.2870 66.9735 911.6770
θr = 0.02 592.0230 38.5400 955.4130
θr = 0.03 611.4670 25.4588 974.8570
θr = 0.04 621.1890 19.0941 948.5790
θr = 0.10 638.6890 7.6376 1002.0790
† in $M-y; ‡ Investment cost plus annualized generating cost, in $M-y.
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
Main contributions of this chapter are the three stochastic models for generation, trans-
mission, and generation and transmission expansion for the vertically integrated industry.
The most complete model is a two-stage mixed-integer nonlinear program that considers
randomness in the demand, equivalent availability factors, and transmission capacity fac-
tors; the latter are incorporated to the model by means of probabilistic constraints. The
mean-variance Markowitz theory is successfully applied as a risk minimization technique.
It is shown, through various numerical examples, that as the risk aversion increases (large
values of θr) the overall cost increases and the variance of the annualized generation cost
decreases; consequently, the risk is minimized. Also, as the probability of satisfying the
chance constraints increases, the overall cost increases. From the EVPI obtained from
the numerical examples, it is concluded that the stochastic models presented are a good
representation of the uncertainties faced by the investment plans since the SS is not far
from the WSS. An alternative to compute the VSS when the EEV becomes infeasible is
presented. By comparing the deterministic models with the stochastic models, this chapter
shows that even simple models can lead to significant savings and can be effectively applied
as a first step when planning a system expansion to narrow the wide range of possibilities
to just a few.
Chapter 4
Risk Minimization in Pool Electricity
Markets
In the idealized restructured electricity industry, market participants always find the eco-
nomic incentives to invest in new generation and in new transmission. In the real-world
this is not the case. The opening of this chapter, presents the state-of-the-art of generation
and transmission expansion planning in the re-regulated electricity industry. One of the
biggest challenges that the re-regulated electricity industry faces, is the high levels of un-
certainty in the supply and demand bids submitted to the ISO. Pool electricity markets, as
of today, are cleared under the strong assumption of having a perfectly known future. In
reality, the inability to predict what the supply and demand functions would be introduces
risk into the market clearing process. Therefore, to shield against that type of risk in order
to obtain a “closer-to-real-life” solution is an interesting problem. This chapter considers
random variations on the levels and on the slopes of the supply and demand functions.
Positive and negative correlations are considered between the corresponding coefficients of
the supply and demand curves. By means of the mean-variance Markowitz theory, the
risk introduced by these random variations is minimized. A comprehensive analysis of the
effects that the risk minimization has on the nodal spot prices, and on the point-elasticities
of the supply and demand curves is made. The non-linear optimization model presented
in this chapter is validated through a three-, a six-, and a 21-node system.1
1A 57- and a 118-node system are presented in Appendix D.
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This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, a review of the state-of-the-art of
generation and transmission expansion in the re-regulated electricity industry is presented.
Section 4.2 presents some economical definitions used in a power pool electricity market
and in power system planning. Section 4.3 sketches the general problem when there is ran-
domness in supply and demand functions; the expected social cost function is introduced.
In Section 4.4, an analysis of the effects that the mean-variance Markowitz theory as a
risk minimization technique has on the nodal prices and on the price-point elasticities of
the supply and demand functions is given. Section 4.5 presents the general formulation of
the risk minimization problem from supply and demand uncertainty for a pool electricity
market. An analysis of the dual variables is done and the effects on the nodal prices and
price-point elasticities is studied in a three-, a six-, and a 21-node system. Finally, Section
4.6 concludes.
4.1 A Few Words on Deregulation
Since the appearance of the first decentralized power systems, all the effort has been focused
on the short-term period of power system economics and on how to encourage competition
among market participants. When the consequences of ignoring power system planning
began to surface, the attention of market participants as well as of regulators turned to
power system planning. The concept of centralized system planning no longer exists in an
open access scheme.
Under a power-pool market-based operation, the concept of market-driven power system
expansion involves allowing market participants, without any regulatory intervention, to
invest in new generation, transmission, or a combination of both as a response to economical
signals such as spatial variations on LMPs. In a linearized power-flow model and ignoring
losses, spatial variations on LMPs indicate that the system is congested. The presence of
congestion does not necessarily mean that the reliability of the system is compromised;
it means that the power system cannot support the trading patterns that the market
participants are willing to make, i.e., consumers at load pocket nodes are prevented, by
system constraints, from importing cheap energy from producers at generation pocket
nodes. There is still no general consensus as for which economical signal should prompt
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any system expansion. Market-driven generation expansion is easier to implement, and
conceptually clearer, than market-driven transmission expansion.
For the decentralized generation expansion case, profit-maximizing market participants
invest in new generation based on their expectation of energy prices, return on new invest-
ments, and demand growth. Therefore, generation expansion is motivated by price; the
revenues, based on market prices, have to cover the capital and operating costs [11, 12].
When load faces real-time prices and is elastic enough, high energy prices indicate high
levels of demand, and tight competitive supply and demand conditions. This, in turn,
provides an incentive to invest in new generation [13]. Since demand is price-responsive in
an electricity market, there exists a correlation between load and price and this affects the
shape of the load duration curve, in fact, a price duration curve is sometimes proposed for
planning [3]. A price duration curve plots the number of hours that the price equals or
exceeds a preset price; it represents the price behavior of a power system over time.
A few problems may arise with transmission capacity expansion, especially when tran-
sitioning to deregulation. A power system that is designed to be operated by a vertically
integrated industry presents a specific set of power flow patterns. When competition is
introduced, these power flow patterns are altered. Market participants start to follow
competitive rules, causing the power flow patterns to change more frequently and more
significantly than ever before, making them to deviate from the flows that the original
system was meant to support. This new situation creates new bottlenecks, bringing up
system constraints that before deregulation were not restrictive and may create a heavily
congested system [23].
The situation that prevails in many electricity markets around the world is that trans-
mission expansion has not been able to keep up with the competition needed; in some cases,
the incentives are either low or nonexistent. Market regulators have been prone to use the
concept of regulated revenue through transmission access fees, providing no incentive to
eliminate congestion. The absence of such an incentive is because the transmission owner’s
income is always the same and it is not dependant on the performance of the grid [24].
For the decentralized transmission expansion case there are numerous, and sometimes
conflicting, proposals about what should incetivize transmission investments. Some of
these are: i) spatial variations on LMPs, ii) FTRs, and iii) congestions costs. With regards
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to the spatial variations on LMPs, [14] and [15] state that the main objective of transmis-
sion expansion under deregulation is to encourage competition among participants. LMPs
provide a good measure of the level of competitiveness in an electricity market. In an
ideal perfectly-competitive electricity market, the price of energy is the same throughout
the system and consumers are able to purchase energy from any producer without any
limitation. Therefore, according to [14] and [15], the ultimate goal of transmission expan-
sion is to equalize the LMPs throughout the system by totally alleviating the congestion,
that is, to achieve a flat price profile. The idea of a flat price profile as a goal for trans-
mission expansion rests in the fact that as a network becomes more and more congested,
the gap between LMPs grows larger and larger. When the gap between LMPs is large
enough, then the transmission system should be expanded. On the ground of FTRs, [16]
suggests that long-term FTRs can be used to create incentives for transmission expansion.
When a private investor makes an addition to the grid, it receives the revenues associated
with the expansion via FTRs allocated by the ISO; in this way, the investor can recover
its investment. In order for the private investor to recover its investment, [16] assumes
a small variation in the LMPs defining the FTRs, i.e., the ex-post transmission network
remains with a certain level of congestion. The right level of expansion of the transmission
grid is such that the remaining congestion revenue covers the investment of the expansion.
Since FTRs are granted to the market participants that are involved in the transmission
expansion to recover their investment [10], FTRs are to be rightly priced [17]. Because of
the presence of economies of scale, any transmission expansion tends to be lumpy and it
usually has a great effect on market prices. When the grid configuration is greatly affected
by the expansion, there is the possibility that the prices after the investment cannot longer
support it. Therefore, although the investment may be lumpy, it should be small enough
so it does not have a major impact on the market prices. Depending on the size of the
system, transmission investments can be made in modules, small enough to have a minimal
effect on the market prices after the expansion. Another undesirable effect of lumpiness
is that it can cause and under-investment in the transmission network. In any case, the
project chosen must never mitigate completely the congestion nor have a large effect on
LMPs. As stated above, after a transmission expansion is made, the fixed charges needed
to recover the investment may be greater than the ex-post congestion rents awarded to the
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investors. It has been suggested that a combination of access fees and long-term contracts
could recover the investment. Rightly priced FTRs, as a long-term guarantee, can be used
to prevent the imposition of access fees in order to pay for the transmission expansion.
Concerning congestion costs, [18] – [20] establish that the total congestion cost is a good
criterion to measure the level of expansion needed in a transmission network. In fact, any
system expansion, in generation or transmission, brings about a reduction in the conges-
tion costs [48]. The reduction in the congestion cost is a good way of measuring the social
value of the investment of any system expansion. The merchant investor must be granted
the reduction in the congestion cost (total surplus created by the expansion [13]) in order
to create proper incentives for the investments.2 There should be a compromise between
the congestion cost saving (social value of investment) and the transmission expansion
investment cost; this will define an acceptable level of congestion after the expansion
A sound new proposition is to develop a coordinated generation and transmission ex-
pansion plan. The concept of having a coordinated generation and transmission expansion
plan in a open access scheme, stems from the fact that generation and transmission in-
vestments can be treated as competitors. The condition of an import constrained area
can be alleviated either by reinforcing the transmission link that connects the import con-
strained area to the system, or by building cheap generation at the import constrained
area. Which investment plan is favored depends on which one of them has a greater social
value.3 An efficient power system expansion plan under an open access scheme should
encourage coordination between generation and transmission expansion due to their in-
trinsic interrelationship. Therefore, some regulation is still needed not only to achieve this
goal but also to oversee the transmission sector since, by nature, it should remain as a
monopoly. Certain measure of regulation is also needed because an economic transmission
investment made by market participants can affect the reliability of the system. Hence, the
proposal of any transmission expansion should be first submitted to the regulator agent
2This is under the assumption that the supply curves represent the true marginal costs and that the
demand curves represent the true willingness to pay, i.e., perfect competition.
3For a detailed discussion on the social value of an investment whether in generation or in transmis-
sion, and on how generation and transmission expansion projects are not interchangeable, please refer to
Appendix B
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for approval [17]. The goal of any regulatory mechanism is to reconcile the profit-driven
merchant investor’s goals with the reliability-oriented planner’s goals, and to reconcile the
private and the public interests [10,13,17,49].
4.2 Economic Implications of Generation and
Transmission Expansion
Basic economic theory states that, under perfect competition and ignoring transmission
constraints and losses, the quantity and the price for energy are determined by the in-
tersection of the supply and demand curves. This situation can be thought as two nodes
connected through a transmission line with capacity K large enough so it is not bind-
ing. One node is considered as a net supply,4 for having cheaper generation than the other,
while the other is considered as a net demand.5 The intersection of the supply and demand
curves as well as the consumer and producer surpluses are shown in Figure 4.1.
When the transmission capacity K limits the flow of power from the net supply node
to the net demand node, expensive generation from the net demand node has to be used
to satisfy the demand because of the inability to import cheap energy from the net supply
node; the cost of running more expensive generation from the net supply node is known
as congestion cost or redispatch cost [13]. Another way of understanding the congestion
cost is as the loss of social benefit computed as the difference between net benefits with-
out considering transmission capacity limits and considering them [19]. This out-of-merit
dispatch originates two market clearing prices, one for each node, ρS and ρD. When K is
binding the flow of power the transmission capacity shadow price, or the congestion price,
is defined as ζ = ρD − ρS. The congestion rent is the area defined by the congestion price
and the capacity of the line, that is ζK. When transmission capacity is increased, say
by ∆K, the congestion cost is reduced as shown in Figure 4.2. Hence, the social value
of the investment is the reduction of the congestion cost caused by the expansion. From
4ρ versus q; cost increases as demand increases. It is assumed that the curve reflects the true marginal
cost of production.
5q versus ρ; demand decreases as price increases. It is assumed that the curve reflects the true marginal
willingness to pay.
Chapter 4. Risk Minimization in Pool Electricity Markets 75
Figure 4.1: Supply and demand curves.
Figure 4.2 it can be seen that the social value of the investment can be tracked down
by the changes in the producer and consumer surpluses and the change in the congestion
rent after the expansion is carried out.6 In the case of Figure 4.2, the consumer and the
producer surpluses are increased while the congestion rent decreases.
If losses are to be considered, and in the presence of congestion, the nodal prices have
three components: i) a component due to the cost of the marginal unit at a given swing
bus, ii) a component due to losses, and iii) a component due to congestion. With nodal
pricing all users pay indirectly for transmission through sale and purchase of power at the
various nodes [50]. Also, the merchandizing surplus, or network revenue, is made of two
parts: i) the congestion rent and ii) the cost of line losses. The merchandizing surplus can
be computed as the difference in full nodal prices connected through a transmission line
times the power that flows through the line. One way that the congestion rent component
can be computed is by using the congestion component of the full nodal price times the
power that flows through the line.
6Numerical examples are given in Appendix B.
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Figure 4.2: Effects of congestion.
4.3 The Expected Social Cost Function
The model presented in this chapter is for a double-sided pool electricity market where
the ISO clears the market and also manages congestion. The ISO receives as inputs the
bids of the generation and distribution companies, a double-sided pool electricity market,
while considering transmission constraints. The ISO then determines the optimal levels of
production and consumption, power flows, and LMPs that minimize the total social cost
given by the difference between the total generation cost and the total demand benefit
[48,51].
Assume a quadratic non-decreasing concave function as the consumer’s benefit and take
its derivative as the affine inverse demand function.





B′(d) = MB(d) = b1 − b2d, (4.2)
where d is the demand, and b1 and b2 are constants.
Assume also a quadratic non-decreasing convex function as the supplier’s variable gen-
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eration cost and take its derivative as the affine supply function.





C ′(g) = MC(g) = a1 + a2g, (4.4)
where g is the generation, and a1 and a2 are constants.
Figure 4.3: Two-node network.
The social cost function for the system shown in Figure 4.3 is













Under the rather strong assumption of a perfectly known future, the minimization of
the social cost, Equation (4.5), renders the following closed form solution








Note that g∗, d∗, and ρ∗, form part of the deterministic solution to the social cost mini-
mization problem. Unfortunately, the future cannot be perfectly predicted. A few decades
ago, [1] and [52] acknowledged randomness in the levels of demand that, in turn, originate
random vertical variations on the demand curve [53]. However, those results cannot be
directly applied to electricity markets since they deal with linear objective functions. In
this chapter, all the coefficients in Equations (4.1)–(4.4) are considered as random. Also,
an analysis on the effects that the mean-variance Markowitz theory has on the elasticities
of the supply and demand curves is made.
First, consider Equations (4.1) and (4.2) with the parameters b1 and b2 as random.
Random b1 accounts for vertical random variations of demand while b2 accounts for ran-
dom variations on the demand slope. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show these two separate cases,
respectively.
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Figure 4.4: Random vertical variation of demand.
In like manner, in Equations (4.3) and (4.4), the random vertical variations of supply
are represented by a1 while the random variations on the supply slope are represented by
a2. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show these two different cases, respectively.
Because the parameters a1, a2, b1, and b2 are considered as random, one no longer
can compute a deterministic social cost function. What needs to be computed now is an
expected, or average, social cost function. The expectation of any random variable gives
information about its value on the average.
The expected value of the social cost when b1, a1, and both b1 and a1 are random is
shown in Equations (4.8)–(4.10), respectively.







































The expected value of the social cost when b2, a2, and both b2 and a2 are random is
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Figure 4.5: Random variation on the demand slope.
shown in Equations (4.11)–(4.13), respectively.



































The expected social cost when b1 and b2; a1 and a2; and b1, b2, a1, and a2 are random
is shown in Equations (4.14)–(4.16), respectively.



































The inability to predict the random changes in a1, a2, b1, and b2, introduce risk in the
social cost function. The goal is then to somehow minimize the risk in the expected social
cost function that comes from uncertainties on the levels and on the slopes of the demand
and supply functions.
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Figure 4.6: Random vertical variation of supply.
4.4 Mean-Variance Markowitz Theory—Impacts of Risk
Minimization
Using the mean-variance Markowitz theory, the objective function that minimizes the mean
value of the social cost along with its variance is
min E{SC(g, d)} + θrσ2SC , (4.17)
where θr, like before, is the risk parameter that weighs the importance that the minimiza-
tion of the variance has.
4.4.1 Risk from supply and demand intercepts
As stated before, when there is uncertainty from the supply and demand levels, the in-
tercepts of the supply and demand functions are considered as random variables. The
variance of the social cost when b1, a1, and both b1 and a1 are random, assuming they are
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Figure 4.7: Random variation on the supply slope.














For this particular situation, it is easy to obtain a closed-form solution. When only the
demand levels are random, the minimization of the expected social cost and its variance
renders
g∗ = d∗ =
E{b1} − a1




b2 + 2θrσ2b1 + a2
+ a1. (4.22)
From Equation (4.21), one can see that as θr increases, the demand d decreases. From
Equation (4.22), since a1 < E{b1} (otherwise one would have no solution), as θr increases,
the price ρ decreases.
The effects of the mean-variance Markowitz theory as a risk minimization technique
can be seen from an analysis of the first order optimality conditions with respect to d. The
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Lagrangian for this simple problem is











d2 − ρ(g − d), (4.23)
and the first order optimality condition with respect to d is
ρ∗ = E{b1} − (b2 + 2θrσ2b1)d. (4.24)
Equation (4.24) shows that the minimization of the social cost variance has the equivalent
effect of changing the slope of the demand function. As θr increases, the slope also in-
creases, and the demand function is less sensitive to price changes. This can be seen, using
Equations (4.21), (4.22), and (4.24), from the definition of demand price-point elasticity











































From Equation (4.25), with a1 < E{b1}, one can see that as θr increases the elasticity for
a given point decreases. In other words, a risk averse attitude (large values of θr) decreases
the elasticity of the demand curve for a given point.7
When only the supply levels are random, the minimization of the expected social cost
and its variance renders the following closed-form solution:
g∗ = d∗ =
b1 − E{a1}




a2 + 2θrσ2a1 + b2
+ b1. (4.27)
From Equation (4.26), one can see that as θr increases, the generation g decreases. From
Equation (4.27), since E{a1} < b1, as θr increases the price ρ also increases. Note that θr
has the opposite effect on the price with respect to the case of random demand.
7For the supply/demand point-elasticity, when |η| < 1 the supply/demand is inelastic and when |η| > 1
the supply/demand is elastic [54].
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The Lagrangian for this simple problem is











g2 − ρ(g − d), (4.28)
and the first order optimality condition with respect to g is
ρ∗ = E{a1} + (a2 + 2θrσ2a1)g. (4.29)
Equation (4.29) shows that the minimization of the social cost variance has the equivalent
effect of changing the slope of the supply function. As θr increases, the slope increases,
and the supply function becomes less sensitive to price changes. This again can be seen,
using Equations (4.26), (4.27), and (4.29), from the supply price-point elasticity for a given













































A risk averse attitude decreases the elasticity of the supply curve for a given point.
Finally, when both demand and supply levels are random, and assuming they are uncor-
related, the minimization of the expected social cost and its variance renders the following
closed-form solution:
g∗ = d∗ =
E{b1} − E{a1}













(E{b1} − E{a1}) + E{a1}. (4.32)
From Equation (4.31), one can see that as θr increases, the demand d/generation g de-
creases.
The Lagrangian function is












2) − ρ(g − d). (4.33)
The first order optimality conditions with respect to d and g are as in Equations (4.24)
and (4.29), respectively. Just like before, the minimization of the social cost variance has
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the equivalent effect of changing the slopes of the demand and supply functions which, in
turn, affect their elasticities. As θr increases, both slopes increase, and the demand and
supply functions become less sensitive to price changes. A risk averse attitude decreases
the elasticity of both the demand and supply curves at a given point.
4.4.2 Risk from supply and demand slopes
A more challenging form of uncertainty, mathematically speaking, comes from random
variations in the slopes of the supply and demand functions. The variance of the social cost
when b2, a2, and both b2 and a2 are random, respectively, assuming they are uncorrelated,




















For this particular situation, it is rather difficult to obtain a closed-form solution for
the minimization of the expected social cost and its variance since the objective function
is a quartic equation. However, from the Lagrangian function, one can see the effects that
the minimization of the variance has on the supply and demand functions. For the case
when only b2 is a random variable, the lagrangian function and the first order optimality
condition with respect to d are













d4 − ρ(g − d), (4.37)
ρ∗ = b1 − E{b2}d − θrσ2b2d3. (4.38)
From Equation (4.38), one can see that the minimization of the social cost variance has an
equivalent effect of reshaping the demand function. It transforms the demand curve from a
linear to cubic function. The more important the minimization of the variance, the larger
the effect the cubic term has on the demand function. The demand price-point elasticity
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For the case when only a2 is a random variable, the Lagrangian function and the first
order optimality condition with respect to g are
L(g, d, ρ) = a1g +
1
2










g4 − ρ(g − d), (4.40)
ρ∗ = a1 + E{a2}g + θrσ2a2g3. (4.41)
It can bee seen from Equation (4.41), just like before, that the minimization of the social
cost variance reshapes the supply function transforming it from a linear to a cubic function.
The more important the minimization of the variance, the larger the effect that the cubic













When both slopes, b2 and a2, are considered as random, the effect on the supply and
demand functions is the same: the supply and demand function are reshaped and trans-
formed from linear to cubic functions, i.e., Equations (4.38) and (4.41). The price-point
elasticity for a given point is like in Equations (4.39) and (4.42).
4.4.3 Risk from supply and demand intercepts and slopes
When considering randomness in the intercepts and slopes of the supply and demand
curves, it is logical to assume that there exists a correlation between b1 and b2, and between
a1 and a2. The covariance is a measure of how much two random variables vary together.
The covariance is defined as σX,Y = E{XY } − E{X}E{Y }. If σX,Y > 0, Y increases as
X increases. If σX,Y < 0, Y decreases as X increases.
The variance of the social cost when the intercept and the slope of the demand function,
the supply function, and both the supply and demand functions are taken as random, is






















3 − σb1,b2d3 + σ2a1g2 + σ2b1d2. (4.45)
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Again, it is difficult to obtain a closed-form solution of the minimization of the ex-
pected social cost and its variance. The Lagrangian function, and its first order optimality
condition with respect to d when only the intercept and the slope of the demand function
are considered as random are













4 − σb1,b2d3 + σ2b1d2
)
− ρ(g − d), (4.46)
ρ∗ = E{b1} − E{b2}d − θr
(
σ2b2d
3 − 3σb1,b2d2 + 2σ2b1d
)
. (4.47)
Minimizing the social cost variance, from Equation (4.47), reshapes the demand function; it
goes from a linear function to a cubic function. The more important the risk minimization,
the bigger the impact the cubic and the quadratic terms have. The demand price-point






(E{b2} + 2θrσ2b1)d + θr(σ2b2d3 − 3σb1,b2d2) − E{b1}






When only the intercept and the slope of the supply function are considered as random,
the lagrangian function and its first order optimality condition with respect to g are
L(g, d, ρ) = E{a1}g +
1
2














− ρ(g − d),







Similarly, the supply function, Equation (4.50), goes from a linear to a cubic function.






(E{a2} + 2θrσ2a1)g + θr(σ2a2g3 + 3σa1,a2g2) + E{a1}






When the intercepts and the slopes of both supply and demand curves are random
variables, the effect of the risk minimization is the same: the supply and demand functions
are transformed from linear to cubic functions, like in equations (4.47) and (4.50), and
their elasticities are like in Equations (4.48) and (4.51).
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4.5 General Formulation—An Analysis on
Dual Variables
The preceding analysis is for a simple radial network. It helps with the basic understanding
of social cost variance minimization. This section discusses the more general case for any
number of nodes and any number of lines. The mean-variance social cost minimization
problem, including transmission constraints, can be defined as [3, 55]
min fs(gs, ds) + f(g
r,dr) + θr[vs(gs, ds) + v(g
r,dr)] (4.52)
s.t. gs − ds + 〈e, gr − dr〉 = 0, (4.53)
H(gr − dr) ≤ f , (4.54)
where fs(gs, ds) = E{a1,s}gs + 12E{a2,s}g2s − (E{b1,s}ds − 12E{b2,s}d2s) is the expected social









is the mean social cost function at every node except the swing bus, gr is
the reduced generation vector with elements gν , d
r is the reduced demand vector with





















d4ν) + σa1,ν ,a2,νg
3
ν − σb1,ν ,b2,νd3ν + σ2a1,νg2ν + σ2b1,νd2ν
)
is the social cost
variance function at every node except the swing bus, θr is the risk factor, e is the unitary
vector, H is the transfer admittance matrix, and f is the maximum value for the power-
flow vector with elements fi-j.
The Lagrangian of the problem shown in Equations (4.52)–(4.54) is
L(gs, ds, gr,dr, ρs,µ) = fs(gs, ds) + f(gr,dr)
+ θr[vs(gs, ds) + v(g
r,dr)]
− ρs[gs − ds + 〈e, gr − dr〉]
− µT [H(gr − dr) − f ], (4.55)
µi-j ≤ 0, ∀ i-j ∈ I. (4.56)
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The first-order optimality condition with respect to generation at every node except
the swing bus is
∇gr f(gr,dr) + θr∇gr v(gr,dr) = ρse + HT µ, (4.58)
ρ = ρse + ω. (4.59)








The first-order optimality condition with respect to demand at every node except the
swing bus is
−∇dr f(gr,dr) − θr∇dr v(gr,dr) = ρse + HT µ, (4.61)
ρ = ρse + ω. (4.62)
From Equation (4.57), one can see that the price at the swing bus now has two com-
ponents. The first component is the marginal cost of the generating unit at the swing bus
while the second component can be interpreted as the cost, originated by the randomness in
supply at the swing bus, of minimizing the social cost variance. Note that, from Equation
(4.59), the price at every other node is still affected by the congestion prices; the classical
concept of congestion rents remains unchanged [13, 56]. Equations (4.60) and (4.62) can
be interpreted in a similar way.
The minimization of the social cost variance, assuming that a1,s, a1,ν , a2,s, a2,ν , b1,s,
b1,ν , b2,s, and b2,ν are random variables, has a direct impact on the elasticities of the
marginal cost and benefit functions. The most drastic change is that it in fact changes the
supply/demand function from a linear to a cubic function.
Next, the mathematical model is evaluated8 with a three-, six-, and a 21-node system.
The numerical results are discussed and further insight is provided on the elasticities of
the supply and demand curves. All the pertinent data is given in Appendix C.
Without any loss of generality, it is assumed that the intercepts and slopes of the
demand functions are negatively correlated while the intercepts and slopes of the supply
functions are positively correlated.
8All models are implemented in the optimization software GAMS using the MINOS solver [42].
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A Three-Node System
The three-node system is shown in Figure 4.8. Take Node 3 as the slack node. All the
pertinent data is given in Appendix C.
Figure 4.8: Three-node system.
Table 4.1 shows some results when the demand levels are uncertain. One can see that,
as the risk aversion increases, the nodal prices, total demand, and social cost variance they
all decrease. The mean social cost increases as the risk aversion increases.
Table 4.2 shows some results when the supply levels are uncertain; as θr increases, the
nodal prices and mean social cost also increase; the demand levels, and social cost variance
they all decrease.
Finally, assume that there is uncertainty from the supply and demand levels. Table 4.3
shows some results. As θr increases, the mean social cost also increases; the price at the
swing bus (Node 3), the demand levels, and the social cost variance they all decrease.
Table 4.4 shows some results when only the slopes of the demand functions are random.
It can be seen that, as θr increases, the social cost variance decreases. It too can be observed
that the nodal prices, generation, and demand levels have an overall tendency to decrease
as θr increases.
In Table 4.5, some results are shown for the case when the supply slopes are taken as
random. As the risk aversion increases, the social cost variance decreases. Note that in
this case, the nodal prices increase as θr increases. However, the supply and demand levels
decrease as θr increases.
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Table 4.1: Random demand levels, three-node system.
Parameter θr = 0 θr = 0.0001 θr = 0.001 θr = 0.01
E{SC}† −3479.99 −3479.9 −3471.95 −3149.62
σ2SC
‡ 156.58 154.75 139.93 70.67
ρ1
∗ 26.62 26.60 26.43 25.76
ρ2
∗ 33.07 32.99 32.30 28.14
ρ3
∗ 29.85 29.80 29.37 24.99
g1
⋆ 101.11 100.32 93.83 67.82
g2
⋆ 60.25 59.65 54.48 23.48
g3
⋆ 174.13 173.694 169.91 131.57
d1
⋆ 64.82 64.47 61.38 37.82
d2
⋆ 113.96 113.80 112.03 83.48
d3
⋆ 156.70 155.40 144.8 101.57
† in $/h, ‡ × 103 in $2/h2, ∗ in $/MWh, and ⋆ in MW.
Table 4.6 shows the case when there is randomness in the slopes of both the supply and
demand curves. Just as expected, a risk averse position decreases the social cost variance.
As θr increases, the supply and demand levels decrease. Unlike the two previous cases, the
nodal prices inconsistently go up and down. One has to remember that the congestion in
the transmission lines also varies as θr varies.
Table 4.7 gives some results when both the intercepts and slopes of the demand curves
are taken as random. It can be observed that as θr increases, the social cost variance,
nodal prices, generation, and demand levels they all decrease.
In Table 4.8, some results are presented for the case when the intercepts and slopes of
the supply functions are taken as random. It can be observed that the overall tendency of
the social cost variance, generation, and demand levels is to decrease as θr increases. Note
that the nodal prices have a tendency to increase as the risk minimization increases.
Finally, Table 4.9 gives some results when the intercepts and slopes of the supply and
demand functions are random variables. Notice that the nodal prices inconsistently go up
and down. The tendency that prevails is that as θr increases, the social cost variance,
generation, and demand levels they all decrease.
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Table 4.2: Random supply levels, three-node system.
Parameter θr = 0 θr = 0.0001 θr = 0.001 θr = 0.01
E{SC}† −3479.99 −3479.97 −3478.01 −3379.05
σ2SC
‡ 63.93 63.49 59.85 39.19
ρ1
∗ 26.62 26.65 26.91 28.53
ρ2
∗ 33.07 33.07 33.12 33.60
ρ3
∗ 29.85 29.86 30.02 31.06
g1
⋆ 101.11 100.43 94.71 61.25
g2
⋆ 60.25 60.06 58.442 46.76
g3
⋆ 174.13 173.98 172.58 157.23
d1
⋆ 64.82 64.24 59.28 28.22
d2
⋆ 113.96 113.87 113.01 103.74
d3
⋆ 156.70 156.36 153.45 133.28
† in $/h, ‡ × 103 in $2/h2, ∗ in $/MWh, and ⋆ in MW.
Table 4.3: Random supply and demand levels, three-node system.
Parameter θr = 0 θr = 0.0001 θr = 0.001 θr = 0.01
E{SC}† −3479.99 −3479.81 −3464.77 −2974.53
σ2SC
‡ 220.51 216.84 188.45 78.46
ρ1
∗ 26.62 26.63 26.72 27.57
ρ2
∗ 33.07 32.99 32.35 28.75
ρ3
∗ 29.85 29.81 29.53 26.39
g1
⋆ 101.11 99.65 88.32 48.32
g2
⋆ 60.25 59.46 52.91 20.43
g3
⋆ 174.13 173.54 168.42 122.33
d1
⋆ 64.82 63.89 56.54 21.64
d2
⋆ 113.96 113.70 111.12 78.77
d3
⋆ 156.70 155.06 141.98 90.67
† in $/h, ‡ × 103 in $2/h2, ∗ in $/MWh, and ⋆ in MW.
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Table 4.4: Random demand slopes, three-node system.
Parameter θr = 0 θr = 0.0001 θr = 0.001 θr = 0.01
E{SC}† −3480.02 −3468.34 −3287.16 −2525.75
σ2SC
‡ 1026.20 738.48 295.82 34.55
ρ1
∗ 26.62 26.47 26.22 24.81
ρ2
∗ 33.07 32.27 29.65 27.00
ρ3
∗ 29.85 29.33 25.76 22.61
g1
⋆ 101.11 95.08 85.51 31.17
g2
⋆ 60.25 54.31 34.72 14.95
g3
⋆ 174.13 169.55 138.29 110.68
d1
⋆ 64.82 65.08 55.51 39.26
d2
⋆ 113.96 114.32 94.73 55.91
d3
⋆ 156.70 139.55 108.29 61.63
† in $/h, ‡ × 103 in $2/h2, ∗ in $/MWh, and ⋆ in MW.
Table 4.5: Random supply slopes, three-node system.
Parameter θr = 0 θr = 0.0001 θr = 0.001 θr = 0.01
E{SC}† −3480.02 −3430.99 −3063.17 −2278.06
σ2SC
‡ 2732.60 1432.10 327.46 37.11
ρ1
∗ 26.62 26.99 28.34 31.17
ρ2
∗ 33.07 33.53 34.56 35.60
ρ3
∗ 29.85 30.26 31.45 33.65
g1
⋆ 101.11 103.97 91.24 60.00
g2
⋆ 60.25 61.35 54.84 35.27
g3
⋆ 174.13 146.38 96.97 53.58
d1
⋆ 64.82 57.77 31.78 0.00
d2
⋆ 113.96 105.16 85.39 65.27
d3
⋆ 156.70 148.77 125.89 83.59
† in $/h, ‡ × 103 in $2/h2, ∗ in $/MWh, and ⋆ in MW.
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Table 4.6: Random supply and demand slopes, three-node system.
Parameter θr = 0 θr = 0.0001 θr = 0.001 θr = 0.01
E{SC}† −3480.02 −3411.05 −2914.10 −1914.82
σ2SC
‡ 3758.80 1919.40 406.72 39.32
ρ1
∗ 26.62 26.82 27.65 28.80
ρ2
∗ 33.07 32.81 31.23 28.80
ρ3
∗ 29.85 29.81 29.44 28.80
g1
⋆ 101.11 98.84 83.18 51.14
g2
⋆ 60.25 56.52 40.06 20.18
g3
⋆ 174.13 143.99 92.19 48.79
d1
⋆ 64.82 59.07 39.05 17.54
d2
⋆ 113.96 106.75 85.93 52.37
d3
⋆ 156.70 133.52 90.46 50.20
† in $/h, ‡ × 103 in $2/h2, ∗ in $/MWh, and ⋆ in MW.
Table 4.7: Random demand intercepts–slopes, three-node system.
Parameter θr = 0 θr = 0.0001 θr = 0.001 θr = 0.01
E{SC}† −3480.02 −3451.74 −3040.46 −1943.96
σ2SC
‡ 2285.90 1535.10 468.05 40.05
ρ1
∗ 26.62 26.40 25.87 23.15
ρ2
∗ 33.07 31.74 27.82 25.28
ρ3
∗ 29.85 28.65 23.92 21.02
g1
⋆ 101.11 92.47 72.18 0.00
g2
⋆ 60.25 50.29 21.09 2.13
g3
⋆ 174.13 163.61 122.16 96.70
d1
⋆ 64.82 62.47 45.69 25.68
d2
⋆ 113.96 110.30 79.34 34.29
d3
⋆ 156.70 133.61 90.40 38.85
† in $/h, ‡ × 103 in $2/h2, ∗ in $/MWh, and ⋆ in MW.
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Table 4.8: Random supply intercepts–slopes, three-node system.
Parameter θr = 0 θr = 0.0001 θr = 0.001 θr = 0.01
E{SC}† −3480.02 −3416.75 −2941.71 −1967.68
σ2SC
‡ 3536.30 1832.30 413.73 49.12
ρ1
∗ 26.62 27.14 28.90 34.82
ρ2
∗ 33.07 33.64 34.93 35.66
ρ3
∗ 29.85 30.39 31.91 35.24
g1
⋆ 101.11 101.38 79.17 48.19
g2
⋆ 60.25 59.52 46.33 22.38
g3
⋆ 174.13 143.16 90.86 46.63
d1
⋆ 64.82 54.84 21.10 0.00
d2
⋆ 113.96 102.99 78.27 64.20
d3
⋆ 156.70 146.22 116.99 53.01
† in $/h, ‡ × 103 in $2/h2, ∗ in $/MWh, and ⋆ in MW.
Table 4.9: Random supply and demand intercepts–slopes, three-node system.
Parameter θr = 0 θr = 0.0001 θr = 0.001 θr = 0.01
E{SC}† −3480.02 −3369.48 −2646.76 −1349.08
σ2SC
‡ 5822.20 2782.50 543.67 40.31
ρ1
∗ 26.62 26.83 27.83 27.56
ρ2
∗ 33.07 32.30 29.11 27.56
ρ3
∗ 29.85 29.57 28.47 27.56
g1
⋆ 101.11 93.12 68.62 25.64
g2
⋆ 60.25 51.03 24.08 8.99
g3
⋆ 174.13 138.86 82.93 39.40
d1
⋆ 64.82 55.64 28.61 13.27
d2
⋆ 113.96 103.56 74.07 31.01
d3
⋆ 156.70 123.82 72.95 29.76
† in $/h, ‡ × 103 in $2/h2, ∗ in $/MWh, and ⋆ in MW.
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A Six-Node System
The six-node system used in this section is shown in Figure 4.9. It is a modification of the
system that appears Section 3.5.2. Take Node 6 as the slack node. All the pertinent data
is given in Appendix C. With this six node system, Equations (4.39), (4.42), (4.48), and
(4.51) are analyzed.
Figure 4.9: Six-node system.
Table 4.10 shows the case when the intercepts and slopes of the supply and demand
curves are random variables. It can be seen that the social cost variance, supply, and de-
mand levels decrease as the risk aversion increases. However, the nodal prices inconsistently
go up and down as θr increases.
Take the demand located at Node 5. Using Equation (4.39), the price-point elasticity
when b2 is a random parameter, one can see that as θr varies from 0.0001 to 0.01, |η| varies
from | − 30.51| to | − 1.96|. This shows then, that a risk averse position decreases the
elasticity of the demand curve.
Take now the supply function of the generator located at Node 1. Using Equation
(4.42), the price-point elasticity equation when a2 is considered as random, one can see
that as θr varies from 0.0001 to 0.01, |η| varies from |4.20| to |1.16|. This shows that a risk
averse position decreases the elasticity of the supply curve at the given operating point.
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Table 4.10: Random supply and demand intercepts–slopes, six-node system.
Parameter θr = 0 θr = 0.0001 θr = 0.001 θr = 0.01
E{SC}† −4410.36 −4268.72 −3341.10 −1715.58
σ2SC
‡ 7499.40 3496.10 695.31 50.77
ρ1
∗ 28.33 29.24 32.29 31.61
ρ2
∗ 33.08 32.79 32.29 31.61
ρ3
∗ 33.45 33.29 32.29 31.61
ρ4
∗ 31.72 31.77 32.29 31.61
ρ5
∗ 33.83 33.80 32.29 31.61
ρ6
∗ 32.40 32.28 32.29 31.61
g1
⋆ 166.67 149.52 104.90 39.98
g3
⋆ 63.10 57.36 37.35 16.87
g6
⋆ 196.52 152.64 91.67 43.43
d1
⋆ 32.04 14.10 0.00 0.00
d2
⋆ 113.81 97.54 58.96 24.08
d3
⋆ 68.14 63.29 47.67 20.33
d4
⋆ 82.19 71.13 40.83 18.08
d5
⋆ 22.48 22.03 32.81 15.47
d6
⋆ 107.62 91.41 53.65 22.31
† in $/h, ‡ × 103 in $2/h2, ∗ in $/MWh, and ⋆ in MW.
Take now, for instance, the demand located at Node 2. With Equation (4.48), the
price-point elasticity when b1 and b2 are random, one can see that as θr varies from 0.0001
to 0.01, |η| varies from | − 3.52| to | − 1.03|. Once more, the elasticity of the demand
function decreases as the risk aversion increases.
Finally, take now the supply function of the generator located at Node 1. Using Equa-
tion (4.51), the price-point elasticity when a1 and a2 are taken as random, one can see that
as θr varies from 0.0001 to 0.01, |η| varies from |3.95| to | − 1.52|. Again, one can see that
as θr increases, the elasticity of the supply function at a given point decreases.
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A 21-Node System
The last numerical example is the 21-node system shown in Figure 4.10; it is a modification
of the system in Section 3.6.2. Take Node 21 as the slack node. All the pertinent data
appears in Appendix C. Table 4.11 shows how the nodal prices vary as the risk parameter
varies. Just as expected, as θr increases the social cost variance decreases and the expected
social cost increases.
Figure 4.10: 21-one-node system.
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Table 4.11: Random supply and demand intercepts–slopes, 21-node system.
Parameter θr = 0 θr = 0.0001 θr = 0.001 θr = 0.01
E{SC}† −13320.00 −13060.00 −10960.00 −5977.53
σ2SC
‡ 15037.00 8200.00 2043.40 175.45
ρ1
∗ 28.17 28.88 31.79 30.78
ρ2
∗ 36.00 35.81 34.57 30.78
ρ3
∗ 33.37 33.14 33.50 30.78
ρ4
∗ 34.78 34.51 34.09 30.78
ρ5
∗ 33.51 32.88 32.12 30.78
ρ6
∗ 33.85 33.66 32.97 30.78
ρ7
∗ 25.52 25.98 27.98 30.78
ρ8
∗ 33.47 33.22 33.08 30.78
ρ9
∗ 33.77 33.45 33.69 30.78
ρ10
∗ 33.18 32.99 32.47 30.78
ρ11
∗ 28.90 29.70 32.69 30.78
ρ12
∗ 36.62 36.48 34.64 30.78
ρ13
∗ 30.21 30.27 30.06 30.78
ρ14
∗ 31.13 30.94 30.48 30.78
ρ15
∗ 31.96 31.49 30.95 30.78
ρ16
∗ 28.09 28.07 28.45 30.78
ρ17
∗ 33.20 33.02 31.15 30.78
ρ18
∗ 36.74 36.59 32.30 30.78
ρ19
∗ 28.63 29.24 29.18 30.78
ρ20
∗ 21.39 22.90 29.87 30.78
ρ21
∗ 24.63 27.14 31.26 30.78
† in $/h, ‡ × 103 in $2/h2, and ∗ in $/MWh
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4.6 Concluding Remarks
An analysis of the impact that the mean-variance Markowitz theory as a risk minimization
technique has on pool electricity markets is presented. Its importance is stressed due to
the fact that electricity markets face increased uncertainty from random parameters in
the supply and demand functions. If one is able to obtain marginal prices that consider
risk minimization, better planning schemes for the deregulated electricity industry can
be developed. This chapter shows that the mean-variance Markowitz theory has a direct
impact on the price-point elasticities of the supply and demand curves. The most drastic
change is that it transforms the linear supply and demand functions into cubic functions.
The more averse the position towards risk, the lesser the elasticity of the supply and demand
curves and the lesser the supply/demand levels. The nodal prices tend to vary as well as the
risk parameter varies. A marginal price analysis shows that now the price at the slack node
has two components: the one component is the marginal cost of the generating unit at that
bus and the other is a cost component due to the social cost variance minimization. This
marginal price analysis also shows that the concept of congestion prices remains unchanged.
This chapter presents a fresh analysis on the economical impacts of risk minimization in
power pool electricity markets.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Summary of Contributions
The real world calls for more accurate models that take into account the effects of a variety
of random events. The inability to accurately predict these random events introduce risk
into the modeling process. Therefore, it is important not only to implement stochastic
models but also to minimize such risk. The main contribution of this work is the success-
ful application of the mean-variance Markowitz theory as risk minimization technique in
centralized power system planning and in the market clearing process of a pool electricity
market.
In Chapter 2, after addressing the goals for generation and transmission expansion in
a vertically integrated industry, a joint single-stage deterministic model for generation and
transmission expansion in a vertically integrated industry is proposed. The advantages of
this new model are:
◦ Extends the single-nodal point generation planning by way of incorporating a DC
model of the transmission network. This is done by assuming that there is a Load
Duration Curve per node.
◦ Unlike the common practice of setting first a generation expansion scheme and then
performing the transmission expansion planning, the joint planning for generation
and transmission expansion allows the coordination between expansion projects in
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order to attain the common goal of minimizing the annual estimate of generation
cost.
◦ This model incorporates important real-world constraints such as the derated capac-
ity constraints, the stability constraint, and considers the integer nature of generation
and transmission additions.
◦ The model indicates the location of new generation and transmission, and is able to
choose from among a set of different generating technologies in order to satisfy all
the operating modes considered in the Load Duration Curve.
In Chapter 3, all the deterministic models presented in Chapter 2 are modified to
become two-stage stochastic models. Through various numerical examples, the superiority
that stochastic models have over deterministic models is presented; important parameters
to quantify randomness such as the EVPI and the VSS are also presented. The main
contributions of Chapter 3 are listed below.
◦ The models for generation, transmission, and joint generation and transmission ex-
pansion are formulated as two-stage stochastic models. This is possible due to the
structural property of block separability that some multistage stochastic programs
have. Block separability allows the partitioning of the variables into aggregate-level
decisions and detailed-level decisions. The generation and transmission expansion
model has as aggregate-level decisions the investment in new generation and trans-
mission, and as detailed-level decisions the annual estimate of generation.
◦ The mean-variance Markowitz theory is implemented in all the models as a risk
minimization technique; this is done through a risk parameter that trades off variance
minimization with expected value minimization of the detailed-level decisions in the
objective function. Minimizing the variance is a way of minimizing the risk.
◦ To further include in the model the effects of random events, probabilistic constraints
are incorporated. These are the probabilistic transmission line capacity constraints
and the probabilistic generation derated capacity constraints.
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◦ The application of these models, particularly the joint generation and transmission
expansion model, is a first step in generation and transmission expansion planning in
order to evaluate as many alternatives as possible. Once the possibilities are narrowed
to just a few, more complex studies can be implemented, such as AC power flows,
losses, stability, transient analysis, line design, and so forth.
◦ All the stochastic models for generation, transmission, and joint generation and trans-
mission expansion that incorporate risk minimization and probabilistic constraints
are a new approach to centralized power system planning. The numerical examples
show that significant savings can be achieved and the expansion plan supports all
the possible foreseeable scenarios.
In Chapter 4, the mean-variance Markowitz theory is applied to the market clearing
process of a pool electricity market. All the coefficients of the quadratic cost and benefit
functions are considered as random. The main contributions of this chapter are outlined
below.
◦ Randomness in the nonlinear cost and benefit functions through random supply and
demand curves has never been considered in the literature before. An analysis of
the effects that the mean-variance Markowitz theory has, as a risk minimization
technique, on the elasticities of the supply and demand functions when the intercepts
and slopes are taken as random is made. It is shown that, as expected, when the risk
aversion increases, the price responsiveness of both the supply and demand curves
decreases.
◦ Through a dual variables analysis, it is shown that the classic definition of congestion
rents remains unchanged. It is also shown that, at the swing bus, the nodal price
has now two components. The first component is the marginal cost of the unit at
the swing bus and the second component is the cost due to the minimization of the
social cost variance.
◦ If one is able to obtain marginal prices that consider risk minimization, better planing
schemes can be developed for the deregulated electricity industry.
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◦ In an open access scheme, assuming the Independent System Operator is concerned
with the social cost minimization, the social value of an investment can be used as a
decision tool when comparing generation and transmission expansion projects. The
social value of an investment can be tracked down by the changes in the producer
and consumer surpluses, and the change in the congestion rent after an expansion
is made. Therefore generation and transmission expansion projects must be treated
as competitors since, in a strict sense, they are not interchangeable. Whichever plan
has a greater social value of investment should be chosen.
5.2 Directions for Future Research
There is one major extension proposed for this work; this is to formulate a coordinated
power system planning for the deregulated electricity industry. A coordinated power system
planning can be encouraged through competition between generation and transmission
expansion projects. There are several challenges to be addressed both in the formulation
and the implementation. Some of these are described next.
◦ Power system expansion needs to take into account the investment cost minimiza-
tion as well as the network operation social cost minimization. These two different
objectives are in different time scales. Power system operation is in the hourly time
domain (short-term) while generation and transmission investment costs are in the
yearly time domain (long-term). Usually, the operational problem is a double-sided
pool auction which receives as input the bids of generation companies, distribution
companies (consumers) and transmission constraints. The output of this operational
problem is the optimal level of production and consumption, power flow patterns,
and LMPs that minimize the total social cost. The overall formulation of power sys-
tem expansion planning has to bring together these two different time scales [20,57].
Other particular challenge when it comes to the problem formulation is the integer
nature of transmission line/gerating plant additions.
◦ Solution techniques depend on the models used to implement the power system
expansion problem. Planning models can be divided into heuristic, mathematical
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optimization, and meta-heuristic models. Mathematical optimization models are
solved with numerical optimization techniques to obtain an optimal expansion of
the system. Since the objective function and the constraints implemented on these
models are complex and usually non-linear, their solution is difficult and requires a
considerable computational effort. Numerical optimization techniques used to solve
these models are linear programming, dynamic programming, nonlinear program-
ming, mixed integer nonlinear programming, Benders decomposition, hierarchical
decomposition, interior point methods, bi-level programming, and Branch and Bound
algorithms. Economic equilibrium models can also be formulated as mathematical
programming problems [58] – [60]. Heuristic models use logical or empirical rules
to generate and classify the options during the search; usually these models can in-
teract with the user. Heuristic rules may include investment costs, operation costs,
constraint violations, curtailment costs and so forth. Mathematically speaking, an
heuristic model can obtain a good feasible solution (suboptimal) for the expansion
plan. The success of heuristic models is that they are solved with small compu-
tational effort. Some models used are genetic algorithms, object oriented models,
game theory, simulated annealing, expert systems, fuzzy set theory, greedy ran-
domized adaptive search procedure, neural networks, and tabu search algorithms.
Meta-heuristic models are a combination of mathematical optimization models and
heuristic models [11,16,19,20,23,33], [61] – [76].
◦ Liberalized power system planning faces greater uncertainty than centralized power
system planning. Unlike centralized planning, the siting and timing of new gener-
ation plants is unpredictable. Another source of uncertainty in liberalized power
system planning is the suppliers and consumers bids for energy. Consequently, af-
ter developing a coordinated generation and transmission expansion model for the
deregulated electricity industry, all these uncertainties need to be taken into account
and risk minimization techniques should also be implemented.
Appendix A
Stochastic Programming
Stochastic Programming is used when optimal decisions are to be taken when not all
the information is available, it is not known with certainty, or it cannot be perfectly
predicted. In real life many of the constraints in an optimization problem are not know with
accuracy, in fact, are dependant on environment-determining variables (random variables).
Therefore, deterministic optimization methods are no longer suitable to solve these type
of problems.
A classical application of stochastic programming in power systems is capacity expan-
sion of power plants. There are many mathematical models in the literature for stochastic
generation expansion [5, 28], [77] – [79].
This chapter is organized as follows: Section A.1 gives a brief introduction on random
variables. Section A.2 gives a comparison between deterministic and stochastic program-
ming. Section A.3 introduces the multistage stochastic program with fixed recourse and,
using the property of block separability, it is transformed into a two-stage program. Fi-
nally, a detailed analysis of two-stage stochastic programs with fixed recurse is presented
in Section A.4.
A.1 Random Variables
A random variable maps each point, or outcome ω, in the sample space Ω of a random
(chance) experiment to a point in the real line. A random variable takes on a given
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numerical value with some specified probability. Therefore, a random variable can be
thought as a function or rule of assignment. It is important to note that more than
one point in the sample space can be mapped into the same point on the real line. If
the mapping is to the n-dimensional Euclidean space, the mapping is called a random
vector [80]. A random variable1 can be written as
k = K(ω), (A.1)
where
◦ ω is an element in the sample space Ω,
◦ K is the random variable, and
◦ k is the numerical value of the random variable K assumed for a given element ω of
the sample space Ω.
Equation A.1 is depicted in Figure A.1.
Figure A.1: Random variable K(ω) = k.
Random variables can be discrete, continuous, or mixed. Discrete random variables take
on only a countable number of possible values. The probability that the discrete random
variable K takes on the value k can be expressed with the function fK [k] = Pr[ω ∈ Ω :
1It is customary in probability to denote the random variable by capital letters (X,Y,Z, or the like),
an arbitrary point in the sample space by lowercase Greek letters (ζ, ω, ν, or the like), and the value of the
random variable assumed for a given sample space element by the corresponding lowercase letter (x, y, z,
or the like) [81].
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K(ω) = k]. The function fK [k] assigns probabilities to points of the real line and its plot
is known as the Probability Mass Function (PMF). Continuous random variables take on
a continuum of values and it is assumed that any of these values occurs with infinitesimal
probability. The probability that the continuous random variable K takes on the value k
can be expressed with the function FK [k] = Pr[ω ∈ Ω : K(ω) ≤ k]. The function FK [k]
assigns probabilities to intervals of the real line and its plot is known as the Probability
Distribution Function (PDF). Mixed random variables take on a discrete set of values,
each with finite probability, as well as a continuum of values, a specific value of which has
infinitesimal probability [80,81].
From probability theory [5, 46, 82], a probability space (Ω,F , P ) describes the sample
space Ω and the family F of all possible events F with an associated probability measure
P . The sample space Ω is the set of all outcomes ω that a random experiment can have,
thus ω ∈ Ω. The outcomes can form subsets of Ω called events and are denoted by F , thus
F ⊂ Ω. To each event F ∈ F is associated a value P (F ) called a probability. Probabilities
can also be assigned to a specific outcome of a random variable. Some probability properties
are the following:
◦ 0 ≤ P (F ) ≤ 1.
◦ P (∅) = 0.
◦ P (Ω) = 1.
◦ P (F1 ∪ F2) = P (F1) + P (F2) if F1 ∩ F2 = ∅.
A.2 Deterministic vs. Stochastic Programming
A deterministic optimization problem [83,84] minimizes (or maximizes) the objective func-
tion g0 over the feasible set of solutions S. The feasible set of solutions S can be defined
as
S = {x ∈ ℜn | x ∈ X, gi(x) ≤ 0, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m}, (A.2)
where
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◦ ℜn is the set of n-dimensional real vectors,
◦ X ⊂ ℜn, and
◦ gi(x) is a real-valued function on ℜn, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m.
The deterministic optimization problem can be stated as
min z = g0(x) (A.3)
s.t. gi(x) ≤ 0, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m, (A.4)
where x ∈ X ⊂ ℜn.
A deterministic optimization problem has the objective function g0(x) and all the con-
straints gi(x) well defined; hence, the future is assumed to be perfectly known. In real
life this is not possible since the future cannot be predicted with certainty; in fact, the
constraints gi(x) are also dependant on the random vector ξ̃, that is, gi(x, ξ̃).
The stochastic optimization problem can be stated as
min z(ω) = g0(x, ξ̃) (A.5)
s.t. gi(x, ξ̃) ≤ 0, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m, (A.6)
where x ∈ X ⊂ ℜn minimizes the objective function on the corresponding set of feasible
solutions, and ξ̃ is a random vector2 that varies over a set Ξ ⊂ ℜq. In this formulation,
it is assumed that for every event F ∈ F and F ⊂ Ξ, the probability P (F ) is known and
is independent of x. The constraints are random variables, that is, gi(x, ·) : Ξ 7→ ℜ ∀ x, i
[46, 82].
A.3 Multistage Stochastic Programming with Fixed
Recourse
Decision problems are hardly solved in two stages; they usually are solved after taking
several decisions that adapt to outcomes as they evolve over time. A more suitable way to
2In ℜq one can only represent sets of the type I[a,b) = {x ∈ ℜq|ai ≤ xi < bi, i = 1, · · · , q}.
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model real life problems is by means of a multistage stochastic model with fixed recourse.
The following formulation is based on [5,78].
The multistage stochastic linear program with fixed recourse can be written as
min z = c1
′
x1 + Eζ2{min c2(ξ̃)
′
x2(ξ̃2) + · · · + EζH{min cH(ξ̃)
′
xH(ξ̃H)} · · · } (A.7)
s.t. W 1x1 = h1, (A.8)
T 1(ξ̃)x1 + W 2x2(ξ̃2) = h2(ξ̃), (A.9)
· · · ...
TH−1(ξ̃)xH−1(ξ̃H−1) + WHxH(ξ̃H) = hH(ξ̃), (A.10)
x1 ≥ 0, (A.11)
xt(ξ̃t) ≥ 0, ∀ t = 2, . . . , H, (A.12)
where3 c1 ∈ ℜn1 , and h1 ∈ ℜm1 are known vectors; W 1 ∈ ℜm1×n1 is a known matrix
(fixed recourse, not dependant on ξ̃). ct(ξ̃) ∈ ℜnt , ht(ξ̃) ∈ ℜmt , T t−1(ξ̃) ∈ ℜmt×nt−1 ,
and W t ∈ ℜmt×nt (known matrices) are for all t = 2, . . . , H; ξ̃ is defined on (Ξ,F , P ).
ζt(ξ̃)′ = (ct(ξ̃)′, ht(ξ̃)′, T t−11 (ξ̃), . . . , T
t−1
mt
(ξ̃)) is a random Nt-vector on (Ξ, Σ
t, P ) for all
t = 2, . . . , H and Σt ⊂ Σt+1. Note that the dependance of xt on ξ̃t is not functional as
in the case of ct(ξ̃), T t−1(ξ̃), and ht(ξ̃); it indicates that the decisions xt(ξ̃t) are not the
same under different realizations up to time t of ξ̃t. Decisions xt(ξ̃t) are chosen so that the
involved constraints hold almost surely for all ξt ∈ Ξ.
Using the principles of dynamic programming, and with the stages of the stochastic
program going from 1 to H, one can define states for a deterministic dynamic program as
xt(ξ̃t). Note that the only interconnection between periods is through the realization of








s.t. TH−1(ξ̃)xH−1 + WHxH(ξ̃) = hH(ξ̃), (A.14)
xH(ξ̃) ≥ 0. (A.15)




, ∀ t, the dynamic programming type of re-
3The superscript 1 is used only to stress that it is the first stage.
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xt(ξ̃) + Qt+1(xt) (A.16)
s.t. T t−1(ξ̃)xt−1 + W txt(ξ̃) = ht(ξ̃), (A.17)
xt(ξ̃) ≥ 0, (A.18)
where xt indicates the state of the system.
A.3.1 Block separable recourse
Multistage stochastic programs have, either naturally or by manipulation, a very particular
structural property: block separability. A multistage stochastic problem is in a way a set of
subproblems in a decision tree. The decision vector can be divided into an aggregate-level
decision vector and a detailed-level decision vector. Because of this partition in two of the
decision vector, the objective function and the constraint matrices are also partitioned in
two. The following definition is taken from [5].
A multistage stochastic linear program has block separable recourse if for all periods
t = 1, . . . , H and all ξ̃, the decision vectors, xt(ξ̃), can be written as xt(ξ̃) = (wt(ξ̃), yt(ξ̃))
where wt represents aggregate level decisions and yt represents detailed level decisions. The
constraints also follow these partitions:


















3. The other components of the constraints are random but we assume that for each




















where the zero components of T t correspond to the detailed level variables.
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A.3.2 Block separable multistage programs as two-stage pro-
grams
When a multistage stochastic program has block separable recourse, it is possible to trans-
form it into a two-stage stochastic program. Detailed-level variables have no direct effect
on future constraints. Aggregate-level variables can be grouped together and sent into
the first stage. The first stage is then composed of the aggregate-level decisions while
the second stage is composed of the detailed-level decisions. Because of this separation,
a multistage stochastic problem can be transformed into a two-stage stochastic problem.
Multistage stochastic integer programs can also be transformed into two-stage programs
as long as the integer variables are associated with the aggregate level decisions. For an
extensive discussion on how to transform multistage stochastic programs into two-stage
stochastic programs, please refer to [78].
A.4 Two-Stage Stochastic Programming with Fixed
Recourse
The following discussion is taken in part [5, 46,79,85].
The two-stage recourse problem incorporates the characteristics of the anticipative
model and the adaptive model of stochastic optimization. The two-stage recourse mathe-
matical model is a trade-off between the long-term anticipatory strategies and the short-
term adaptive adjustments.
A.4.1 Anticipative model
The anticipative optimization model is used to plan in view of all the possible future values
or realizations of ξ̃. To do this, the frequency of occurrence—or probabilities—of all the
possible values of ξ̃ are used.
One probabilistic feasibility definition of the stochastic problem that includes the mean4
4The mean or expectation can be thought as the average value of the random variable. The average
is weighed by the probabilities. In the case of a discrete random variable, the expectation is defined
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of the random variable gi(x, ·) can be defined as some x ∈ X that satisfies the constraints
gi(x, ξ̃) ≤ 0, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m with a certain level of reliability
Pr {ξ̃ | gi(x, ξ̃) ≥ 0, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m} ≥ α, (A.21)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is a preestablished reliability level, or x ∈ X can be in the mean of the
random variable gi(x, ·), that is,
E{gi(x, ξ̃)} ≤ 0, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m. (A.22)
Another probabilistic feasibility definition that includes the mean and the variance5 of
the random variable gi(x, ·) is
E{gi(x, ξ̃)} + β
√
Var{gi(x, ·)} ≤ 0, (A.23)
where β is a positive constant.
A probabilistic optimality definition can be expressed in terms of the feasible x that
minimizes
Pr {ξ̃ | g0(x, ξ̃) ≥ α0}, (A.24)
where α0 ∈ (0, 1) is a preestablished reliability level, or x minimizes the expected value of
the future objective function
E{g0(x, ξ̃)}. (A.25)
A general formulation for stochastic optimization problems in the probability space
(Ξ,F , P ) is presented next:




f0(x, ξ̃)P (dξ̃) (A.26)
s.t. Fi(x) = E{fi(x, ξ̃)}
=
∫
fi(x, ξ̃)P (dξ̃) ≤ 0, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m, (A.27)





5The variance is the squared value of the standard deviation. The standard deviation σ can be thought
as the average spread about the mean of the random variable. Hence, the variance is defined as σ2X =
Var(X) = E{X2} − E2{X} [81].
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where
◦ x ∈ X ⊂ ℜn,
◦ fi : ℜn × Ξ → ℜ, ∀ i = 1, . . . ,m,
◦ f0 : ℜn × Ξ → ℜ̄, and
◦ ℜ̄ is the set of extended real numbers [83].
A.4.2 Adaptive model
In contrast with the anticipative optimization model where a decision x is made in view of
all the possible future values of ξ̃, the adaptive model makes an observation before choosing
x.
An observation gives a partial description of the random vector ξ̃. Assume that B ⊂ F
is a collection of events that contains the information after an observation is made. The
decision x is a function of ξ̃, in turn, the values of ξ̃ depend on B, this in turn, implies that
the decision x is a function of B. The stochastic optimization problem for each ξ̃ ∈ Ξ can
be stated as
min z(ξ̃) = E{f0(x, ·)|B}(ξ̃) (A.28)
s.t. E{fi(x, ·)|B}(ξ̃) ≤ 0, ∀ i = 1, · · · ,m, (A.29)
where x ∈ X ⊂ ℜn, and E{·|B} is the conditional expectation given B.
When B = F (ξ̃ becomes completely known), the stochastic optimization problem for
all ξ̃ becomes
min z(ξ̃) = f0(x, ξ̃) (A.30)
s.t. fi(x, ξ̃) ≤ 0, ∀ i = 1, · · · ,m, (A.31)
where x ∈ X ⊂ ℜn.
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A.4.3 The recourse model
As mentioned before, the recourse model brings together the properties of the anticipative
model and the adaptive model. For the sake of simplicity, the two-stage stochastic linear
program with fixed recurse is analyzed, the same concepts apply for non-linear programs.
The general definition of a deterministic linear program is
min z = c′x (A.32)
s.t. Ax = b, (A.33)
x ≥ 0, (A.34)
where c, x ∈ ℜn; b ∈ ℜm; and A ∈ ℜm×n.
Assume that b is not known with certainty but its probability distribution function is
available. Under these circumstances, x cannot be found to satisfy the constraint Ax = b
for whatever value of b. The discrepancy to equate Ax and b is a random variable that
depends on x. Assume that a penalty function for such discrepancy is given. The objective
function can be defined as the minimization of the sum between c′x and the expected value
of the penalty function (or recourse function). The classic formulation, developed in 1955
by Beale and Dantzig, is
min z = c′x + E{Q(x, ξ̃)} (A.35)
s.t. Ax = b, (A.36)
x ≥ 0, (A.37)
where
Q(x, ξ̃) = min q(ξ̃)′y(ξ̃) (A.38)
s.t. T (ξ̃)x + Wy(ξ̃) = h(ξ̃), (A.39)
y(ξ̃) ≥ 0. (A.40)
Equations (A.35)–(A.37) are the first stage problem while Equations (A.38)–(A.40) are
the second stage problem. The first stage decisions are represented by x ∈ ℜn1 . Related
to x are the vector c ∈ ℜn1 , the vector b ∈ ℜm1 , and the matrix A ∈ ℜm1×n1 . In the
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second stage, the random vector ξ̃ is defined in the probability space (Ξ,F , P ). For a given
realization of the random vector ξ̃ the second stage data for q(ξ̃) ∈ ℜn2 , h(ξ̃) ∈ ℜm2 , and
T (ξ̃) ∈ ℜm2×n1 become available; each one of these is also a random variable. The matrix
W ∈ ℜm2×n2 is known as the recourse matrix. When the recourse matrix is dependant on
ξ̃, it is said that the problem has random recourse; when W is not dependant on ξ̃, it is
said that the problem has fixed recourse.
The set of feasible first stage decisions is
X = {x ∈ ℜn1 |Ax = b, x ≥ 0}. (A.41)
The set of dual feasible solutions for the second stage problem is
Π = {π ∈ ℜm2 |πW ≤ q}. (A.42)
The problem in Equations (A.35)–(A.40) can be restated as
min z = c′x + E{Q(x, ξ̃)} (A.43)
s.t. Ax = b, (A.44)
T (ξ̃)x + Wy(ξ̃) = h(ξ̃), (A.45)
x ≥ 0, (A.46)
y(ξ̃) ≥ 0. (A.47)
This problem, put in words is: Find the “here-and-now” solution x before the compo-
nents of b become known; when they become known, a recourse y must be found from the
second stage problem to minimize the penalty function.
Unlike q(ξ̃), h(ξ̃), and T (ξ̃), the dependence of y(ξ̃) is not functional; it only indicates
that different decisions y are taken depending of different realizations of ξ̃. It must be
noted that the expectation of the second stage objective Q is taken over all realizations of




In the idealized restructured electricity industry the concept of centralized power system
planning no longer exists. Market participants are responsible for the investment in new
generation and in new transmission. In this ideal world, market participants always find
economic incentives to promote a reliable and economic operation of the power system. In
the real world, only generation expansion has been left to market participants with fairly
acceptable results so far. Transmission expansion however, has not been able to keep up
with the participant’s trading patterns. To ensure a reliable and economic operation of
a power system, regulatory intervention has played a key role in assessing and evaluating
any proposed investment in new transmission. The ISO, in its role as system overseer,
faces the multi-objective problem of evaluating and inducing efficient investments by using
economical signals and issuing various types of orders. The ISO might choose as an objec-
tive the minimization of the social cost (maximization of social welfare), minimization of
local market power, the maximization of consumer surplus, the minimization of congestion
rents, the minimization of congestion cost, or even security measures [86]. As in the case
of centralized power system planning, these different optimization criteria are inconsistent.
In general, generation and transmission expansion projects can be either a substitute
or a complement of each other. The situation of an import constrained area can be al-
leviated either by reinforcing the transmission link that connects the import constrained
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area to the system, or by building cheap generation at the import constrained area. In a
strict sense, generation is not an exact substitute for transmission and vice versa. When
elastic demands are considered, upgrading the link between a generation and an import
constrained area causes an increase in demand and a decrease in expensive generation at
the import constrained area. This in turn causes an increase in the consumer surplus that
out weighs the decrease in the producer surplus at the import constrained area. Also,
it is of paramount importance to consider the effects that network upgrades have on the
transfer admittance matrix since the power that flows in the system is dependant on such
matrix. When modeling transmission expansion projects it is not enough to increase the
transmission limits but also to upgrade the transfer admittance matrix. All the previous
assertions are exemplified by a set of numerical examples.
Since transmission and generation are not an exact substitute for each other in a strict
sense, any investor faces the dilemma of choosing which investment to consider or if a
combination of both is better. This situation opens the door for competition between
generation and transmission investments.
B.1 Generation and Transmission Expansion Projects
are not Interchangeable
In this section, it is shown that generation expansion is not an exact substitute for trans-
mission and vice versa. Consider the two-node system shown in Figure B.1. Node 1 has
cheap generation while Node 2 has two generators and three elastic demands. At Node 2,
Generator 3 is less expensive than Generator 2.
Figure B.1: Two-node system.
The demand and supply functions are as in Equations (4.2) and (4.4), respectively. All
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the pertinent data is given in Appendix C.
This numerical example considers losses as the sum of the squared power flow of the
line times the resistance of the line over all the lines [3]. The objective function is the
minimization of the social cost. The constraints are the usual system constraints. The
solution is as shown in Figure B.2.
Figure B.2: Social Welfare 3311.959 $/h.
In the radial network an investor, either a new entrant or a participant of the market,
faces the dilemma of either upgrading the transmission line or building a generator at Node
2 that can provide cheap energy. Suppose first that the capacity of the transmission line is
doubled. When doubling the capacity of the transmission line, the susceptance is doubled
while the resistance is halved. This is shown in Figure B.3.
Figure B.3: Social Welfare 3459.168 $/h.
The social value of the investment can be tracked down by the changes in the consumer
and producer surpluses, the congestion rent, and the cost of losses. These results are shown
in Table B.1.
Now, instead of doubling the capacity of the line, assume that the investor decides to
build a 30 MW generator at Node 2 of the same technology of the one located at Node 1.
In this simple radial network, it is logical to substitute the expansion of the transmission
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Table B.1: Social value of the investment, trans. exp., two-node system.
Surplus
Before After ∆
Generator 1 12.753 51.012 +38.259
Generator 2 159.537 133.899 −25.638
Generator 3 2034.736 1932.44 −102.296
Demand 1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Demand 2 535.283 616.862 +81.579







Social Value of the Investment: 147.135
All quantities in $/h
line with the building of a generator at the import constrained area since, in reality, such
an expansion opens the possibility to import 30 more megawatts from the generator at
Node 1. This situation is shown in Figure B.4.
It can be seen from Figures B.3 and B.4, that the nodal price, generation, and de-
mand levels at Node 2 are exactly the same. However, the social welfare for the case
of generation expansion is bigger than the one for transmission expansion. Even though
strengthening the transmission line or building a new generator provide exactly the same
30 more megawatts of cheap energy, in the case of transmission expansion the congestion
rent and the transmission losses are bigger due to the increased flow of power in the line
making the generation expansion option more attractive from the point of view of the social
welfare maximization. In the case of generation expansion, the cost of losses remains the
same with respect to the congested case without any expansion. The details are shown in
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Figure B.4: Social Welfare 3518.198 $/h.
Table B.2.
Table B.2: Social value of the investment, gen. exp., two-node system.
Surplus
Before After ∆
Generator 1 12.753 12.753 0.0







Social Value of the Investment: 206.236
All quantities in $/h
It can be seen that, for this case, a generation expansion increases the social welfare
more than the transmission expansion does and it actually reduces the congestion rent.
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In the radial case it is easy to track down from which generating unit comes the increase
of cheap energy due to the strengthening of the transmission line, in this case from generator
g1. Also, the change in the parameters of the transmission line does not alter the pattern
of the power flow; before and after the transmission expansion, 100% of the flow goes from
Node 1 to Node 2. However, these two conditions vanish in the presence of loop flows.
Consider the three-node network shown in Figure B.5. All three transmission lines are
identical. The data is shown in Appendix C.
Figure B.5: Three-node system.
With the minimization of the social cost as the objective function, considering losses,
taking Node 3 as the swing bus, and taking a limit of 30 MW at every line, one obtains
the solution shown in Figure B.6.
It can be seen, from Figure B.6, that Line 1–2 is congested. If the capacity of trans-
mission Line 1–2 is doubled, and considering the changes in the network parameters, one
gets the results shown in Figure B.7.
As before, the social value of the investment can be tracked down by the changes in the
consumer and producer surpluses, the congestion rent, and cost of losses. These results
are shown in Table B.3.
From the transfer admittance matrix [3], one can see how the power flows in the trans-
mission lines are related to the net power injections at every node excluding the swing
bus. Equations (B.1) and (B.2) show the transfer admittance matrices before and after
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Figure B.6: Social Welfare: 3416.542 $/h.





















































Note how drastically the patterns of the power flows in the transmission lines change.
For instance, before the expansion, the power that flows in the congested line, Line 1–2,
is given by one third of the net power injected at Node 1 minus one third the net power
injected at Node 2 whereas after the expansion, the power that flows in the line is given by
two fifths of the net power injected at Node 1 minus two fifths of the net power injected at
Node 2. Clearly, the changes in the parameters of the transmission lines must be considered
in system planning studies.
Now assume that instead of strengthening the link between Nodes 1 and 2, an investor
decides to build a generator at Node 2 of the same technology of the one at Node 1. The
solution obtained is shown in Figure B.8.
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Figure B.7: Social Welfare: 3548.612 $/h.
In the same fashion, the social value of the investment can be tracked down by the
changes in the consumer and producer surpluses, the congestion rent, and the cost of
losses. These results are shown in Table B.4.
Comparing Figures B.7 and B.8, one can see that the nodal prices and the levels of
generation and demand are similar but not the same. This is mainly because in the presence
of loop flows, it is not easy to track down from which generator, or set of generators,
comes the extra energy that flows to the import constrained area due to the transmission
expansion. Under these circumstances, the building of a transmission line cannot be exactly
replaced by the building of a generator at the import constrained area.
In essence, generation and transmission expansion projects are not interchangeable in
a strict sense. The presence of loop flows in a network makes it difficult to track down
from which generator, or set of generators, comes the extra energy that flows to the import
constrained area due to a transmission expansion plan. The numerical examples show
that, when planning a transmission expansion, it is not enough to modify the transmission
capacity limits; the changes in the transmission line parameters, like the impedance and the
resistance, have to be taken into account since these affect the transfer admittance matrix
of the system which in turn drastically affects the power flows patterns of the system.
Whenever considering a system expansion, generation and transmission investments must
be treated as competitors and not as interchangeable options.
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Table B.3: Social value of the investment, trans. exp., three-node system.
Surplus
Before After ∆
Generator 1 141.003 204.310 +63.307
Generator 2 253.571 192.828 −60.743
Generator 3 1685.113 1670.023 −15.09
Demand 1 104.217 72.216 −32.0
Demand 2 318.617 446.09 +127.473







Social Value of the Investment: 131.582
All quantities in $/h
Figure B.8: Social Welfare: 3666.949 $/h.
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Table B.4: Social value of the investment, gen. exp., three-node system.
Surplus
Before After ∆
Generator 1 141.003 146.384 +5.381
Generator 2 253.571 195.097 −58.474
Generator 3 1685.113 1648.427 −36.686
Generator 4 0.0 235.227 +235.227
Demand 1 104.217 101.002 −3.215
Demand 2 318.617 440.582 +121.965







Social Value of the Investment: 250.419
All quantities in $/h
Appendix C
Test Systems Data
This appendix presents all the data for the numerical examples throughout this work. All
the tables are self-contained in order to avoid excessive explanatory comments.
C.1 Data for Section 3.4.3




1 500 0.1664 0.925 0.04087
3 200 0.5781 0.965 0.01327
† in MW, ‡ in $M/MW-y
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1 500 0.1737 0.1664 0.925 0.04087
2 100 0.0816 0.3723 0.965 0.01327
3 100 0.0405 0.5781 0.965 0.01327
† in MW, ‡ in $M/MW-y
Table C.3: Operating modes and probabilities of foreseeable scenarios.
Operating mode cfm Below Average
† 30% Average† 40% Above Average† 30%
Base 1.00 480 540 600
Mid 0.60 180 240 300
Peak 0.25 80 140 200
† in MW.
C.2 Data for Section 3.5.2




1 6 400 0.1664 0.925 0.04087
2 1 700 0.3723 0.965 0.01327
3 3 500 0.5781 0.965 0.01327
† in MW, ‡ in $M/MW-y
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Table C.5: New transmission lines data; six-node system.
From: To: R† X† f i-j
‡ ci-j
⋆ E{αi-j} σ2αi-j
2 6 0.075 0.30 100 3.0 1 0
4 6 0.080 0.30 100 3.0 1 0
† in p.u, 100 MVA base; ‡ in MW; ⋆ in $M/y.
Table C.6: Existing transmission lines data; six-node system.
From: To: R† X† f i-j
‡ ci-j
⋆ E{αi-j} σ2αi-j
1 2 0.10 0.40 100 4.0 0.75 0.0085
1 4 0.15 0.60 80 5.6 0.45 0.0085
1 5 0.05 0.20 100 2.25 0.65 0.0085
2 3 0.05 0.20 100 2.25 0.75 0.0085
2 4 0.10 0.40 100 4.0 0.75 0.0085
3 5 0.05 0.20 100 2.25 0.85 0.0085
† in p.u, 100 MVA base; ‡ in MW; ⋆ in $M/y.
Table C.7: Different foreseeable scenarios and their probabilities; six-node system.
Node Below Average† 30% Average Demand† 40% Above Average† 30%
1 90 120 150
2 140 170 200
3 100 130 160
4 210 240 270
5 110 140 170
6 90 120 150
† in MW.
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C.3 Data for Section 3.6.2
The transmission lines data, existing and new, for the six-node system is as in Section C.2.




1 1 500 0.1664 0.925 0.04087
2 3 300 0.3723 0.965 0.01327
3 6 400 0.5781 0.965 0.01327
† in MW, ‡ in $M/MW-y







1 500 17.37 16.64 0.925 0.04087
2 300 8.16 37.23 0.965 0.01327
3 100 4.05 57.81 0.965 0.01327
† in MW, ‡ in $M/MW-y
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Table C.10: Below average level of demand, six-node system; 30%.
Operating Mode† Node
1 2 3 4 5 6
B‡ 80 80 80 80 80 80
B‡ + M⋆ 90 100 90 200 90 90
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 90 140 100 210 110 90
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
Table C.11: Average level of demand, six-node system; 40%.
Operating Mode† Node
1 2 3 4 5 6
B‡ 90 90 90 90 90 90
B‡ + M⋆ 110 120 110 220 110 110
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 120 170 130 240 140 120
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
Table C.12: Above average level of demand, six-node system; 30%.
Operating Mode† Node
1 2 3 4 5 6
B‡ 100 100 100 100 100 100
B‡ + M⋆ 130 140 130 240 130 130
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 150 200 160 270 170 150
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
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Table C.13: Existing transmission lines data, 21-node system.
i j R† X† f i-j
‡ ci-j
⋆ E{αi-j} σ2αi-j
1 2 0.0026 0.0139 200 1.47 0.95 0.0085
1 5 0.0218 0.0845 200 5.46 0.95 0.0085
1 3 0.0546 0.2112 200 12.39 0.95 0.0085
2 4 0.0328 0.1267 100 7.77 0.90 0.0085
2 6 0.0497 0.1920 100 11.34 0.90 0.0085
3 9 0.0308 0.1190 200 7.35 0.95 0.0085
3 13 0.0067 0.0519 200 12.48 0.90 0.0085
4 9 0.0268 0.1037 200 6.51 0.95 0.0085
5 10 0.0228 0.0883 200 5.67 0.95 0.0085
6 10 0.0139 0.0605 200 4.20 0.95 0.0085
7 8 0.0159 0.0614 200 4.20 0.95 0.0085
8 9 0.0427 0.1651 200 9.87 0.95 0.0085
8 10 0.0427 0.1651 200 9.87 0.95 0.0085
9 11 0.0061 0.0476 100 11.58 0.90 0.0085
9 12 0.0054 0.0418 100 10.38 0.90 0.0085
10 11 0.0061 0.0476 100 11.58 0.90 0.0085
10 21 0.0124 0.0966 100 21.78 0.90 0.0085
11 21 0.0111 0.0865 600 19.68 0.95 0.0085
12 14 0.0050 0.0389 600 9.79 0.95 0.0085
13 14 0.0022 0.0173 600 5.28 0.95 0.0085
13 19 0.0063 0.0490 600 11.88 0.95 0.0085
14 15 0.0033 0.0259 600 7.08 0.95 0.0085
14 17 0.0030 0.0231 600 6.48 0.95 0.0085
15 16 0.0018 0.0144 600 4.68 0.95 0.0085
15 20 0.0135 0.1053 600 23.58 0.95 0.0085
16 19 0.0033 0.0259 600 7.08 0.95 0.0085
17 18 0.0051 0.0396 600 9.93 0.95 0.0085
18 21 0.0028 0.0216 600 6.18 0.95 0.0085
19 20 0.0087 0.0678 600 15.78 0.95 0.0085
† in p.u, 100 MVA base; ‡ in MW; ⋆ in $M/y.
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Table C.14: Non-existing transmission lines data, 21-node system.
i j R† X† f i-j
‡ ci-j
⋆ E{αi-j} σ2αi-j
2 4 0.0328 0.1267 100 7.77 0.90 0.0085
2 6 0.0497 0.1920 100 11.34 0.90 0.0085
3 13 0.0067 0.0519 200 12.48 0.90 0.0085
9 11 0.0061 0.0476 100 11.58 0.90 0.0085
9 12 0.0054 0.0418 100 10.38 0.90 0.0085
10 11 0.0061 0.0476 100 11.58 0.90 0.0085
10 21 0.0124 0.0966 100 21.78 0.90 0.0085
† in p.u, 100 MVA base; ‡ in MW; ⋆ in $M/y.




1 3 40 0.5781 0.965 0.01327
1 4 150 0.2558 0.925 0.04087
2 3 40 0.5781 0.965 0.01327
2 4 150 0.2558 0.925 0.04087
7 2 300 0.3723 0.965 0.01327
11 2 600 0.3723 0.965 0.01327
13 2 60 0.3723 0.965 0.01327
13 4 150 0.2558 0.925 0.04087
14 4 150 0.2558 0.925 0.04087
16 1 400 0.1664 0.925 0.04087
19 1 400 0.1664 0.925 0.04087
20 1 300 16.64 0.925 0.04087
21 4 660 0.2558 0.925 0.04087
† in MW, ‡ in $M/MW-y
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1 400 0.1737 0.1664 0.925 0.04087
2 100 0.0816 0.3723 0.965 0.01327
3 400 0.0405 0.5781 0.965 0.01327
4 100 0.1761 0.2558 0.925 0.04087
† in MW, ‡ in $M/MW-y
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Table C.17: Below average level of demand, 21-node system; 30%.
Operating Mode† Node
1 2 3 4 5
B‡ 47.50 42.50 78.75 32.50 31.25
B‡ + M⋆ 76.00 68.00 126.00 52.00 50.00
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 108.30 96.90 179.55 74.10 71.25
6 7 8 9 10
B‡ 60.00 55.00 75.00 76.25 85.00
B‡ + M⋆ 96.00 88.00 120.00 122.00 136.00
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 136.80 125.40 171.00 173.85 193.80
11 12 13 14 15
B‡ 116.25 85.00 138.75 43.75 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ 186.00 136.00 222.00 70.00 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 265.05 193.80 316.35 99.75 0.00
16 17 18 19 20
B‡ 146.25 80.00 56.25 0.00 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ 234.00 128.00 90.00 0.00 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 333.45 182.40 128.25 0.00 0.00
21
B‡ 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 0.00
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
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Table C.18: Average level of demand, 21-node system; 40%.
Operating Mode† Node
1 2 3 4 5
B‡ 57.00 51.00 94.50 39.00 37.50
B‡ + M⋆ 91.20 81.60 151.20 62.40 60.00
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 129.96 116.28 215.46 88.92 85.50
6 7 8 9 10
B‡ 72.00 66.00 90.00 91.50 102.00
B‡ + M⋆ 115.20 105.60 144.00 146.40 163.20
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 164.16 150.48 205.20 208.62 232.56
11 12 13 14 15
B‡ 139.50 102.00 166.50 52.50 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ 223.20 163.20 266.40 84.00 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 318.06 232.56 379.62 119.70 0.00
16 17 18 19 20
B‡ 175.50 96.00 67.50 0.00 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ 280.80 153.60 108.00 0.00 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 400.14 218.88 153.90 0.00 0.00
21
B‡ 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 0.00
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
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Table C.19: Above average level of demand, 21-node system; 30%.
Operating Mode† Node
1 2 3 4 5
B‡ 65.55 58.65 108.67 44.85 43.12
B‡ + M⋆ 104.88 93.84 173.88 71.76 69.00
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 149.45 133.72 247.77 102.25 98.32
6 7 8 9 10
B‡ 82.80 75.90 103.50 105.22 117.30
B‡ + M⋆ 132.48 121.44 165.60 168.36 187.68
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 188.78 173.05 235.98 239.91 267.44
11 12 13 14 15
B‡ 160.42 117.30 191.47 60.37 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ 256.68 187.68 306.36 96.60 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 365.76 267.44 436.56 137.65 0.00
16 17 18 19 20
B‡ 201.82 110.40 77.62 0.00 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ 322.92 176.64 124.20 0.00 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 460.16 251.71 176.98 0.00 0.00
21
B‡ 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ 0.00
B‡ + M⋆ + P∗ 0.00
† in MW; ‡ Base, ⋆ Mid, and ∗ Peak.
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C.4 Data for Section 4.5
The transmission network data for the six- and 21-node systems is as in Sections C.2 and
C.3, respectively. The only difference is the transmission capacity limits; all transmission
lines have a capacity limit of 50 MW.
Table C.20: Cost function data; three-node system.
Node ν E{a1,ν†} E{a2,ν‡} σ2a1,ν σ2a2,ν σa1,ν ,a2,ν
1 24 0.026 2.4 0.0026 0.0624
2 25 0.134 2.5 0.0134 0.3350
3 10 0.114 1.0 0.0114 0.1140
† in $/MWh, ‡ in $/MW2h.
Table C.21: Benefit function data; three-node system.
Node ν E{b1,ν†} E{b2,ν‡} σ2b1,ν σ2b2,ν σb1,ν ,b2.ν
1 30 0.052 3.0 0.0052 −0.1560
2 39 0.052 3.9 0.0052 −0.2028
3 38 0.052 3.8 0.0052 −0.1976
† in $/MWh, ‡ in $/MW2h.
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Table C.22: Transmission line data.
From: To: R† X† f i-j
‡
1 2 0.0015 0.3 30
3 1 0.0015 0.3 30
3 2 0.0015 0.3 30
† in p.u, 100 MVA base; ‡ in MW.
Table C.23: Cost function data; six-node system.
Node ν E{a1,ν†} E{a2,ν‡} σ2a1,ν σ2a2,ν σa1,ν ,a2,ν
1 24 0.026 2.4 0.0026 0.0624
2 25 0.134 2.5 0.0134 0.3350
3 10 0.114 1.0 0.0114 0.1140
† in $/MWh, ‡ in $/MW2h.
Table C.24: Benefit function data; six-node system.
Node ν E{b1,ν†} E{b2,ν‡} σ2b1,ν σ2b2,ν σb1,ν ,b2.ν
1 30 0.052 3.0 0.0052 −0.1560
2 39 0.052 3.9 0.0052 −0.2028
3 37 0.052 3.7 0.0052 −0.1924
4 36 0.052 3.6 0.0052 −0.1872
5 35 0.052 3.5 0.0052 −0.1820
6 38 0.052 3.8 0.0052 −0.1976
† in $/MWh, ‡ in $/MW2h.
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Table C.25: Cost function data; 21-node system.
Node ν E{a1,ν†} E{a2,ν‡} σ2a1,ν σ2a2,ν σa1,ν ,a2,ν
1 24 0.026 2.4 0.0026 0.0624
2 25 0.134 2.5 0.0134 0.3350
7 10 0.114 1.0 0.0114 0.1140
11 24 0.026 2.4 0.0026 0.0624
13 25 0.134 2.5 0.0134 0.3350
14 10 0.114 1.0 0.0114 0.1140
16 24 0.026 2.4 0.0026 0.0624
19 25 0.134 2.5 0.0134 0.3350
20 10 0.114 1.0 0.0114 0.1140
21 10 0.114 1.0 0.0114 0.1140
† in $/MWh, ‡ in $/MW2h.
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Table C.26: Benefit function data; 21-node system.
Node ν E{b1,ν†} E{b2,ν‡} σ2b1,ν σ2b2,ν σb1,ν ,b2.ν
1 30 0.052 3.0 0.0052 −0.1560
2 39 0.052 3.9 0.0052 −0.2028
3 37 0.052 3.7 0.0052 −0.1924
4 36 0.052 3.6 0.0052 −0.1872
5 35 0.052 3.5 0.0052 −0.1820
6 38 0.052 3.8 0.0052 −0.1976
7 30 0.052 3.0 0.0052 −0.1560
8 39 0.052 3.9 0.0052 −0.2028
9 37 0.052 3.7 0.0052 −0.1924
10 36 0.052 3.6 0.0052 −0.1872
11 35 0.052 3.5 0.0052 −0.1820
12 38 0.052 3.8 0.0052 −0.1976
13 30 0.052 3.0 0.0052 −0.1560
14 39 0.052 3.9 0.0052 −0.2028
15 37 0.052 3.7 0.0052 −0.1924
16 36 0.052 3.6 0.0052 −0.1872
17 35 0.052 3.5 0.0052 −0.1820
18 38 0.052 3.8 0.0052 −0.1976
† in $/MWh, ‡ in $/MW2h.
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C.5 Data for Section B.1
The transmission network data for the three-node system is as in Section C.4.
Table C.27: Cost and Benefit functions data; all systems.
Generator a1,ν a2,ν Demand b1,ν b2,ν
1 24 0.026 1 30 0.052
2 25 0.134 2 39 0.052
3 10 0.114 3 38 0.052
† in $/MWh, ‡ in $/MW2h.
The transmission line data is shown in Table C.28.
Table C.28: Transmission line data; two-node system.
From: To: R† X† f i-j
‡
1 2 0.0015 0.3 30
† in p.u, 100 MVA base; ‡ in MW.
Appendix D
Large Test Systems
This appendix presents two large-scale systems in order to further validate the models
presented in this thesis; these systems are based on the IEEE 57- and 118-node systems
[87]. All the models are implemented using the optimization software GAMS using the
SBB and the MINOS solvers [42]. These models are solved using the NEOS server for
optimization [88]; in all cases, including the problems solved in Chapters 3 and 4, an
integer solution is obtained for the power system expansion problems and a locally optimal
solution is obtained for the power pool electricity market problems. For the power system
expansion problems, the most time consuming part is the branch and bounding process;
solving the nonlinear part poses no challenge.
D.1 A 57-Node System
The 57-node system has a mixture of four different generating technologies and it has eighty
transmission lines. For the generation and transmission expansion case, it is possible to add
generating capacity at every node; one can choose from among four different technologies.
Even though there are no new rights-of-way, it is possible to add up to five new circuits
between every pair of nodes that already have an interconnection. Three operating modes
are considered with three foreseeable scenarios each. These scenarios happen with a known
probability. All the random variables are assumed to be standard normally distributed.
Table D.1 shows some results when the two-stage stochastic model described by Equa-
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tions (3.71), (3.76)–(3.79), (3.60), (3.61), (2.46), (2.54), and (3.64)–(3.68) is solved. The
parameters θr, βt, and βg are allowed to vary. Node 1 is taken as the slack node and the
budget constraint is not binding.
The general tendency observed is that as the risk aversion increases, the variance (stan-
dard deviation) of the generation cost decreases and the overall cost increases. In like man-
ner, as the probability of satisfying the chance constraints increases, the general tendency
is that the overall cost also increases.
Table D.2 shows some results when the model shown in Equations (4.52)–(4.54) is
solved taking Node 1 as the slack node. The intercepts and slopes of all the supply and
demand functions are taken as standard normally distributed random variables. There are
four suppliers and forty-two consumers.
Just as intended, by increasing the value of θr the social cost variance decreases. For
this particular case, the nodal price increases and the generation decreases at the slack
node as θr increases.
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Table D.1: Annualized generating cost, gen. & trans. exp., 57-node system.
Parameter Mean† Std. Deviation† Overall Cost‡
θr = 0.00 210.6300 67.4844 312.7500
θr = 0.02 158.5390 36.0964 321.9790
θr = 0.03 129.4960 24.6157 337.9360
θr = 0.04 179.3230 19.0941 361.6030
θr = 0.10 200.9350 7.6376 362.7250
θr = 0.03, βt = 0
≈ 76%; βg = 0.7 150.6730 25.4588 365.6230
≈ 84%; βg = 1.0 197.8930 25.4588 378.9430
≈ 90%; βg = 1.3 210.9800 25.4588 390.7400
≈ 96%; βg = 1.74 177.5320 25.4588 418.6120
θr = 0.03, βg = 0
≈ 76%; βt = 0.7 170.2940 25.4588 343.1390
≈ 84%; βt = 1.0 179.6750 25.4588 334.9550
≈ 90%; βt = 1.3 196.0680 25.4588 352.6380
≈ 96%; βt = 1.74 175.0800 25.4588 336.8700
βg = 1.3, βt = 1.3
θr = 0.00 237.7020 72.4940 347.9820
θr = 0.01 138.9420 41.3971 371.8620
θr = 0.02 191.5360 38.1881 371.296
θr = 0.03 186.0190 25.4588 418.9390
θr = 0.04 244.6230 19.0941 408.0630
θr = 0.10 214.8920 7.6376 447.8120
† in $M-y; ‡ Investment cost plus annualized generating cost, in $M-y.
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Table D.2: Randomness in supply and demand intercepts–slopes, 57-node system.
Parameter θr = 0 θr = 0.0001 θr = 0.001 θr = 0.01
E{SC}† −8050.29 −7781.21 −6169.20 −3394.88
σ2SC
‡ 13078.00 6135.20 1140.2 95.24
ρ1
∗ 30.37 32.25 35.94 36.44
g1
⋆ 178.70 152.48 99.08 47.61
d1
⋆ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
† in $/h, ‡ × 103 in $2/h2, ∗ in $/MWh, and ⋆ in MW
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D.2 A 118-Node System
The 118-node system has fifty-three generating units with a mixture of four different tech-
nologies. The system has one hundred and eighty-six transmission lines. It is possible to
add generating capacity at every node and there are four different technologies to choose
from. It is also possible to build up to five new circuits between every pair of nodes that
already have an interconnection; there are no new rights-of-way. Three operating modes
are considered; each one of which has three different foreseeable scenarios. These foresee-
able scenarios happen with a known probability. All the random variables are taken as
standard normally distributed.
Now, solving the two-stage stochastic model described by Equations (3.71), (3.76)–
(3.79), (3.60), (3.61), (2.46), (2.54), and (3.64)–(3.68) for the 118-node system one gets
the results shown in Table D.3. Node 69 is taken as the slack node. The execution time
ranges from 0.755 to 31.192 seconds when solved using the NEOS server for optimization.
Some of the model statistics are: 22,304 constraints, 11,178 non-linear variables, and 658
discrete variables.
From the results one can see that as the risk aversion increases, larger values of θr,
the variance (standard deviation) of the generation cost decreases and the overall cost
increases. The overall cost also increases as the probability of satisfying the probabilistic
constraints increases.
Table D.4 shows some results when the model shown in Equations (4.52)–(4.54) is
solved with Node 69 as the slack node. Just like before, the intercepts and slopes of all the
supply and demand functions are taken as standard normally distributed random variables.
There are fifty-three suppliers and ninety-two consumers.
It can be seen that, as θr increases, the social cost variance decreases. It also can be
seen that the generation level at the slack node decreases as the risk aversion increases.
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Table D.3: Annualized generating cost, gen. & trans. exp., 118-node system.
Parameter Mean† Std. Deviation† Overall Cost‡
θr = 0.000 595.398 75.9100 603.558
θr = 0.002 592.530 73.5726 608.850
θr = 0.010 553.937 51.3344 623.417
θr = 0.020 564.638 38.1881 634.118
θr = 0.0, βt = 0
≈ 76%; βg = 0.7 584.317 76.7450 659.077
≈ 84%; βg = 1.0 667.507 85.8750 691.987
≈ 90%; βg = 1.74 710.363 101.3930 779.843
θr = 0.01, βt = 0
≈ 90%; βg = 1.3 713.249 60.9740 756.629
≈ 96%; βg = 1.74 673.669 61.1553 812.629
θr = 0.0, βg = 0
≈ 76%; βt = 0.7 599.466 75.4894 607.626
≈ 84%; βt = 1.0 601.523 76.0043 609.683
≈ 90%; βt = 1.3 604.066 75.6499 612.226
≈ 96%; βt = 1.74 604.775 77.2193 612.935
θr = 0.01, βg = 0
≈ 76%; βt = 0.7 551.369 50.5973 620.849
≈ 90%; βt = 1.3 553.870 50.9000 624.820
θr = 0.02, βg = 0
≈ 90%; βt = 1.3 570.868 38.1881 640.348
βg = 0.7, βt = 0.7
θr = 0.01 603.539 55.4356 674.489
βg = 1.3, βt = 1.3
θr = 0.01 670.976 60.6844 741.926
† in $M-y; ‡ Investment cost plus annualized generating cost, in $M-y.
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Table D.4: Randomness in supply and demand intercepts–slopes, 118-node system.
Parameter θr = 0 θr = 0.0001 θr = 0.001 θr = 0.01 θr = 0.1
E{SC}† −72380.00 −69780.00 −53970.00 −27800.00 −9710.45
σ2SC
‡ 133870.00 60138.00 11122.00 824.84 36.17
ρ69
∗ 30.02 30.66 30.92 30.06 28.93
g69
⋆ 175.66 144.54 88.66 41.96 16.21
† in $/h, ‡ × 103 in $2/h2, ∗ in $/MWh, and ⋆ in MW
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